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Countries that move from authoritarianism to democracy often see
increased rights-based, social justice lawyering after the transition. Given
the new freedoms and opportunities present, this outcome is hardly
surprising. However, relying on a literature and theoretical frame
developed over the past two decades, this study argues that, in fact, such
lawyering can have its historical roots in the legal activism that occurred
during previous authoritarian periods. Consider Africa's most populous
country - Nigeria. Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has
witnessed, in total, nearly 30 years of military dictatorship. In 1999, the
country adopted a democratic system of government, which continues to
this day - albeit shakily. During this time, rights-lawyering has been an
important access-to-justice vehicle for the poor and socially
disadvantaged. Yet, as this study shows, this activity builds upon the brave
efforts of lawyers who aided those unable to represent themselves during
past moments of military rule. Despite being atomized and ad hoc, these
pockets of legal advocacy nevertheless posed challenges to the different
authoritarian regimes, and, importantly, they serve as the foundation for
the right-activism seen today.
INTRODUCTION
Since becoming free from British colonialism in 1960, Nigeria has
experienced, in total, nearly 30 years of military rule: 1966-1979 and then
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again from 1983-1999.' While the years from 1960-1966 and 1979-1983
might be seen as periods of Nigerian democracy, they were nonetheless
fractured times. Only since 1999 has democracy in Nigeria sustainably
taken hold, and even then, the last 18 years have not been easy. There is an
insurgency on-going in the northeast against the Boko Haram network, and
the Delta region of the country also continues to witness instability.2 Given
these conditions, it is not surprising that the current government has faced
enormous challenges. A lack of resources and perpetual bureaucratic
inefficiency have impaired state institutions,' as has corruption - which the
current President, Muhummadu Buhari (himself the head of state of a
military regime during the 1980s), has identified as Nigeria's most pressing
problem.'
The core issue of this study is to understand the extent to which
everyday Nigerians, since 1960, have been able to use the law and lawyers
to access their legal rights. This research falls within the larger theoretical
frame of the role legal institutions and legal professionals play in non-
democratic and transitioning societies. As Tamir Moustafa has noted, this
literature has grown tremendously over the past two decades.' Scholars
focusing on countries such as China, Egypt, Russia, Sudan - and regions
such as Latin America and other parts of Africa and Asia - have
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1. See generally, MAX SIOLLUN, OIL, POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE: NIGERIA'S MILITARY COUP
CULTURE (1966-1976) (2009); OMOLADE ADUNBI, OIL, WEALTH AND INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA
(2015).
2. See SIOLLUN, supra note 1; ADUNBI, supra note 1; MIKE SMITH, BOKO HARAM: INSIDE
NIGERIA'S UNHOLY WAR (2015). For an excellent analysis on Boko Haram and the government's
efforts to deal with it, see the comments from lawyer, academic, and widely respected intellectual, Dr.
Aminu Gamawa: Aminu Gamawa on Boko Haram and Bring Back Our Girls Campaign, AuAZEERA
(June 18, 2014) https://www.youtube.comi/watch?v-i_7nlSRU7fk&t-63s; Should Nigeria Negotiate
with Boko Haram? Aminu Gamawa 's Interview with AIJAZEERA, ALJAZEERA (Aug 6, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Tz6WSNflSO.
3. See SIOLLUN, supra note 1; ADUNBI, supra note 1; SMITH, supra note 2.
4. See Corruption is Nigeria's Worst Problem - Buhari, PREMIUM TIMES, Jan. 12. 2017,
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/220324-corruption-nigerias-worst-problem-
buhari.html. See also Aminu Gamawa on Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Election, Aljazeera, March 30,
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-G6fDPiuoUg.
5. See Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANNUAL REV. L. Soc. SCI.
281 (2014).
198 [Vol. 42:2
2018] Legal Activism 199
demonstrated the ways in which governments use judicial institutions to
maintain control, to govern, and to enhance political capital.'
Simultaneously, these studies show that judiciaries can, at times, also serve
as institutional outlets for those aggrieved by their respective authoritarian
regimes.
There is then a wave of scholarship on the actions of lawyers in these
systems. Dezalay and Garth's work on human rights lawyering during
repressive and transitional times in Latin America argues that such legal
activity shaped, and was shaped by, state policy.' Meili's research, also on
Latin America, shows that social justice lawyering ironically was able to
thrive in authoritarian periods and declined during transitions.'
Michelson's studies on civil and criminal lawyers in China, however, are
more cautious - demonstrating that occasionally these lawyers are able to
make modest social justice strides, but that more frequently, success at
navigating the legal system depends upon the following: how embedded
the lawyers are within the state apparatus, the political nature of the issue,
and guanxi, or the networks and connections of the lawyers themselves. 1
6. See id (providing an excellent state of the literature on this subject.) See also e.g., TOM
GINSBURG & TAMIR MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (2008); MARK F. MASSOUD, LAW'S FRAGILE STATE: COLONIAL, AUTHORITARIAN, AND
HUMANITARIAN LEGACIES IN SUDAN (2013); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007); RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002) [hereinafter CHINA'S LONG
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW]; RANDALL PEERENBOOM, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA (2010)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA]; ANTHONY PEREIRA, POLITICAL (IN)JUSTICE:
AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND ARGENTINA (2005); JYOTI
RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE
(2012); Kathryn Hendley, Rewriting the Rules of the Game in Russia: The Neglected Issue of Demand
for Law, 8 EAST EUR. CONST. REv. 89 (1999); ELISABETH HILBINK, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APOLITICISM: CHILE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2007).
7. See GINSBURG & MOUSTAFA, supra note 6; MASSOUD, supra note 6; MOUSTAFA, supra note
6; CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 6; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA,
supra note 6; PERIERA, supra note 6; RAJAH, supra note 6; Hendley, supra note 6; HILBINK, supra note
6.; See also Peter Solomon, Law and Courts in Authoritarian States, in the INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
Soc & BEHA V. ScI. (2d. ed., James Wright ed. 2015); Kathryn Hendley, 'Telephone Law' and the 'Rule
ofLaw:' The Russian Case, 1 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L., 241 (2009).
8. See Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Investing in Human Rights as an Alternative Political
Strategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING & THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, (Austin Sarat And Stuart Scheingold
eds., 2001); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002).
9. See Stephen Meili, Latin American Cause-Lawyering Networks, in CAUSE LAWYERiNG & THE
STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, (eds., Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, 2001).
10. See Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in
China's Transition from Socialism, 115 AM. J. SOC. 352 (2007); Ethan Michelson, The Practice ofLaw
as an Obstacle to Justice: Chinese Lawyers at Work, 40 L & Soc. REV. 1 (2006). For other important
work on China, see Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an
Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering, 59 THE CHINA JOURNAL 11l
(2008); SIDA LIU & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF LAWYERS
AT WORK (2016); RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE (2013).
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And most relevant for this study is Okechukwo Oko's research on
"lawyers [living] under the military regimes of Nigeria,"" where he finds
that the legal profession "face[d] an intractable dilemma."' 2 Lawyers were
seen as a threat because of their promotion of democracy; at the same time,
military leaders saw them as coercible and a possible legitimizing force for
their authoritarian hold on power." Additionally, lawyers were viewed as
potential saviors by the persecuted; yet if they veered too far in the human
rights direction, they risked their careers and personal safety.1 4 But to not
do enough was also a betrayal to their dignity and professional oath to
uphold the rule of law."s
The analysis here builds upon this important literature. Over half the
population in Nigeria today lives below the poverty line, and there are great
disparities in wealth.16 Moreover, the difficulties that ordinary people have
in redressing their claims or defending their interests only continues to
grow. A meaningful 'safety net' to assist those who have legitimate legal
needs does not exist, resulting in millions of Nigerians' rights simply going
unprotected. The current situation, where access-to-justice is regularly
11. See OKECHUKWU OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS IN AFRICA: LESSONS
FROM NIGERIA 220-221 (2007).
12. Id. at 221. Richard Abel and Philip C.S. Lewis have a multi-volume set of classics on the roles
of lawyers who face various types of quandaries. See e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL AND PHILIP C.S. LEWIS,
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD (1988); RICHARD L. ABEL AND PHILIP C.S. LEWS,
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES (1989); RICHARD L. ABEL AND PHILIP C.S. LEWIS:
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW (1995).
13. OKO supra note 11 at 217-222.
14. Id. at 217-257. In 2013, Professor Kieran McEvoy launched the "Lawyers, Conflict, and
Transitions Project," examining six cases - Cambodia, Chile, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia, and South
Africa. His project culminated in a series of important papers on the challenges, opportunities, and
risks lawyers in transitioning societies face. See generally LAWYERS CONFLICT & TRANSITION,
www.lawyersconflictandtransition.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2018); See also Emma Catterall, Kieran
McEvoy, & Louise Mallinder, Boycotting Unjust Legal Proceedings, LAW. CONFLICT & TRANSITION
(Nov. 2016), available at https://lawyersconflictandtransition.org/themainevent/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/BOYCOTTING-UNJUST-LEGAL-PROCEEDINGS-ENGLISH-FINAL.pdf;
Venitia Govender & Rachel Killian, Lawyers, Conflict & Transition: South Africa, LAW. CONFLICT &
TRANSITION (Dec. 2016), available at https://lawyersconflictandtransition.org/themainevent/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/LAWYERS-CONFLICT-AND-TRANSITION-IN-SOUTH-AFRICA-
DECEMBER-2016.pdf, Jonathan Porter, The Protection of Lawyers in Conflict and Crisis, LAW.
CONFLICT & TRANSITION (Dec. 2016), available at
https://lawyersconflictandtransition.org/themainevent/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/THE-
PROTECTION-OF-LAWYERS-IN-CONFLICT-CRISIS.pdf.
15. OKO supra note 11 at 221-229. For similar constraints and cross-cutting pressures lawyers face
in other contexts, See PAMELA A. JORDAN, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: LAWYERS, THE STATE, AND
LEGAL REFORM (2005); DANIEL LEV, LEGAL EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA:
SELECTED ESSAYS (2000); OSAMA SIDDIQUE, PAKISTAN'S EXPERIENCE WITH FORMAL LAW: AN ALIEN
JUSTICE (2013); Cynthia Farid, New Paths to Justice: A Tale of Social Justice Lawyering in
Bangladesh, 31 WISC. INT'L L.J. 421 (2013); Raymond J. Michalowski, Between Citizens and the
Socialist State: Negotiation ofLegal Practice in Socialist Cuba, 29 L. & SoC'Y REV. 66 (1995).
16. See Poverty & Equity, THE WORLD BANK,
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/NGA. See also, Nigeria, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.
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being denied, cannot stay unaddressed if the Nigerian state hopes to
strengthen and consolidate the rule of law.
Yet, the story is not entirely bleak. There have been attempts over the
years - dating back to 1960 and even during the darkest periods of military
rule - to establish a rights-oriented, legal aid system to assist the needy,
with some occasional success. Section II focuses on the early
independence period of Nigeria, where there was hope that substantive
legal aid programs would emerge." On paper, through different iterative
constitutions, the foundation was set in place. But unfortunately these
plans did not ripen into tangible results because of the military takeover in
1966. Section III then explains how over the next 13 years Nigeria faced
coups and counter-coups. But interestingly during this period, the
promotion and implementation of certain limited access-to-justice
programs did occur.18
Section IV then examines the period between 1979 and 1983, when
Nigeria returned to democracy. During this time, important measures were
taken to construct meaningful legal aid initiatives. 19 Section V describes
how in 1983 the country reverted to military rule, which lasted until 1999,
with the latter part of this period being especially harsh. Nevertheless,
even during this time, grassroots activism did not completely disappear and
attempts to help persecuted communities continued in spurts, in spite of the
great risks that existed.2 0  Finally, Section VI provides an overview of
where the situation stands today, since the country has once again
embraced democracy. 21 This latest moment in Nigeria's post-independence
history offers the best opportunity to go beyond episodic instances of
assistance and towards a longer-term, sustained movement of aid for those
most in need. As this study will argue, the efforts of today build upon the
struggles, and at times, achievements, of past rights-activists - many of
whom worked under arduous, and often authoritarian, circumstances.
17. See infra, Section II.
18. See infra, Section III. See also, SIOLLUN, supra note 1; See generally, BEN 0. NWABUEZE,
MILITARY RULE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN NIGERIA (1992); BEN 0. NWABUEZE, MILITARY RULE
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA (1993).
19. See infra, Section IV. See also Ehimika A. Ifidon, Transitions from Democracy in Africa:
Toward a Pre-Emptive Analysis, 7 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 109-128 (2002).
20. See infra, Section V. In fact, in recent years, scholars have revisited the efforts of rights-based
non-governmental organizations during this period and have levelled critiques, which Section V
discusses. See also ADUNBI, supra note 1; See generally, OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, NIGERIAN
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY RULE, 1983-1999 (2003).
21. See infra, Section VI.
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II. THE EARLY INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: 1960-1966
Although Nigeria officially gained independence from Britain on
October 1, 1960, it had begun to assume certain elements of autonomy
during the late 1950s. During the colonial era, the British passed into law
several constitutions, with the three most important emerging after the
Second World War, in 1946, 1951, and 1954, respectively.22 Enacted
under Governor-General Arthur Richards, the 1946 Constitution granted
enhanced powers to Nigeria's different regional territories. 23  The 1951
Constitution (which came into effect after the '46 Constitution was
suspended) further increased powers at the regional and local levels, but it
also placed at the forefront the importance of having a strong federal House
of Representatives, which would control national policy.24 The 1954
Constitution strengthened principles of federalism, such as prohibiting the
House from vetoing measures taken by the regional governments in the
administration of their own affairs.25
Each of these three documents paid verbal acknowledgment to
individual autonomy, dignity, and the ability of communities to be self-
governed. Broadly speaking, the 1946, 1951, and 1954 constitutions
recognized the extensive diversity within Nigeria, and as such, they each
emphasized that the regions ought to oversee many of their own affairs -
including ensuring that local communities had access to the legal process.26
Yet, in reality these pre-independence constitutions did not detail how this
specific goal was to be accomplished, nor did the British or the respective
regional governments do much in the way of facilitating the provision of
legal services to ordinary Nigerians.
Even the first "Independence Constitution" of 1960 did not serve as the
"[c]ornerstone" 27 of the new Nigerian nation-state. For one thing, this 1960
document was passed into law by an order of the British crown, and Queen
22. Pre-independence constitutions were passed in 1922, 1946, 1951, and 1954. See e.g., UDO
UDOMA, HISTORY AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1995); JOHN A. YAKUBU
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN NIGERIA (2003).
23. See e.g., Sessional paper No. 4 of 1945 Proceedings of the Nigerian Legislative Council and
the Constitution order-in-council, 1946, which established what is widely known as the Richards
Constitution, so named after Sir Arthur Richards, the then colonial Governor of Nigeria.
24. See UDOMA, supra note 22; See also TOYIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, A HISTORY OF
NIGERIA 152-154 (2008).
25. See RICHARD L. SKLAR, NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: POWER IN AN EMERGENT NATION
(2004) 133-140.
26. Id; See also YAKUBU, supra note 22; Sessional Paper No. 4, supra note 23; UDOMA supra note
22; FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24.
27. This is a term coined by Granville Austin in his classic work on the Indian Constitution, which
Nigerian scholars often look to today in reflecting on constitutional jurisprudence. See GRANVILLE
AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1966). But see OKO, supra note 11




Elizabeth II remained as the official head of Nigeria.28 In addition, the
court of last resort for judicial matters stayed in London with the Privy
Council.29  Although this Independence document enumerated principles
such as federalism, separation of powers, the rights of citizenship, and the
doctrine of preemption, because it was not organically created it never
could shake its status as a temporary or incomplete constitution.30
However, the 1963 "Republican Constitution" forever changed
democratic constitutionalism in Nigeria. To begin, this document was
enacted by a federal legislative body and came after a landmark
"constitutional conference [was] held in Lagos on July 25 and 26 1963
where issues bordering on the real independence of Nigeria were
resolved."" The decision to remove the Queen of England as the Nigerian
head of state occurred as one of the first orders of business.3 2 But other
important matters were addressed, such as making the Supreme Court of
Nigeria the apex judicial body in the country; vesting the courts with the
power of judicial review; and broadening the representative nature of
elected political institutions at the national level, including formally
reconstituting Nigeria as a federal republic.33 Indeed, former Attorney
General and legal commentator Uwemedimo Nwoko has argued that the
1963 constitution has been Nigeria's most significant document since
independence, because it carefully provided the parameters of a fair,
functioning system of federalism.34
Unfortunately, as Nwoko and others have noted, the politics of the time
displaced this constitution. Just three years into its tenure, in 1966, it was
superseded by a military coup, which itself was followed by a series of
military governments that lasted for the next 13 years.36 Constitutional
democracy went dark. Yet before it was dismantled, the 1963 constitution,
on paper, did provide certain legal aid protections for the needy.
28. See TOYIN FALOLA & BUKOLA ADEYEMI OYENIYI, NIGERA 50-51 (2015).
29. See CHARLES MWALIMU, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, VOLUME 1, PUBLIC LAw 405 (2005,
2007).
30. Id. See also ABU BAKARR BAH, BREAKDOWN AND RECONSTITUTION: DEMOCRACY, THE
NATION-STATE, AND ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA 101-102 (2005).
31. See Olanrewaju Olamide, History of Nigerian Constitutional, Development,
http://www.djetlawyer.com/history-nigerian-constitutional-development/ ; See BAKARR BAH, supra
note 30 at 101-102; MWALIMU, supra note 29 at 405-406.
32. See BAKARR BAH, supra note 30 at 101-102; MWALIMU, supra note 29; Olamide, supra note
31.
33. See BAKARR BAH, supra note 30 at 101-102; MWALIMU, supra note 29; Olamide, supra note
31.
34. See Nigeria Has to Adopt the 1963 Constitution, THE LEARNED FRIENDS (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://thelearnedfriends.com/2016/11/24/nigeria-adopt-1963-constitution/.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also, FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 158-209.
2018] 203
The Journal of the Legal Profession
For example, it guaranteed all people charged with criminal offenses
the right to have legal representation, to be presumed innocent, and to be
protected against double jeopardy and self-incrimination.37 In addition, "[a
supplemental] legal aid bill was introduced by T.O. Elias, the Attorney-
General in the civilian government immediately prior to the 1966 military
coup."3 8 Due process for defendants wasa priority for these Nigerian
democrats.3 9 But the constitution and the bill remained silent on how
defendants were to actualize these entitlements - and for non-criminal
matters, no reference was made on how to access legal aid. In sum, the
1963 legal framework offered initial steps for promoting a culture of rights-
based activism, but given the ensuing set of military governments that
followed, it never had a chance to fulfill these promises.
III. LEGAL AID IN THE ERA OF MILITARY RULE: 1966-1979
During the first period of authoritarian rule in post-colonial Nigeria,
there were four military leaders, three leadership-assassinations, and
ongoing violence that contributed to great disorder within the country.40
Issues relating to access-to-justice and legal entitlements were not priorities
of the military. If anything, political dissent was seen as treasonous and
punishable by imprisonment or even death.41 In his well-respected treatise
on Nigerian politics, Eghosa E. Osagha has argued that this era of "military
intervention and [military] rule are regarded even by military leaders
themselves - as .. . [a] key indicator of political instability." 4 2
The sheer lack of respect for the rule of law was characteristic of this
era. Consider the famous 1971 E.O. Lakanmi case, where the petitioners
sued the government for unlawfully seizing their private property after they
37. See Constitution of Nigeria, 193, Fundamental Rights, Sec 22, subsections 5-10,
.http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/1963ConstitutionofNigeria.html.
38. See Adrian Collett, Legal Care in Nigeria: Beginnings II: Remaking Land Law and Local
Administration, 24 J. AFRICAN L. 220, 223 (1980) (noting that once the coup occurred, the bill was
tabled until the mid 1970s).
39. Id.
40. The first prime minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, was overthrown by the military
leader Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. Balewa was found murdered after being deposed, and Aguiyi-Ironsi too
was killed in mid-1966 and then was followed by General Yakubu Gabon who stayed in power for nine
years. In 1975, Gabon was overthrown and the country was led then by General Murtala Mohammad,
but in early 1976 Mohammad was killed by coup plotters, led by Buka Suka Dimka. However,
Mohammad's colleague-in-arms, Olusegun Obasanjo, was not assassinated by the coup rebels, and he
thereafter he succeeded his predecessor and led Nigeria until 1979. For a set of readings on this first era
of military rule in independent Nigeria, see FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 158-209; FALOLA &
oYENIYI, supra note 28, at 41-63.
41. For a discussion of how the opposition was treated during this period, See BENJAMIN OBI
NWABUEZE, MILITARY RULE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN NIGERIA (1992); See also Falola & Heaton,
supra note 24, at 158-209; FALOLA & OYENIYI, supra note 28, at 41-63.
42. See EGHOSA E. OSAGHE, THE CRIPPLED GIANT: NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 54 (1998).
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were prosecuted on charges of corruption. 43 The government argued that it
had the authority to undertake such measures and that this issue was non-
justiceable." The Supreme Court of Nigeria ultimately heard the matter
and sided with the petitioners, stating that the government was bound by
the principles of due process enumerated within the 1963 constitution.45
Yet, rather than adhering to the Court's ruling, the military regime voided
the judgment through a subsequent decree, proclaiming that it was the final
arbiter of the rule of law.46
The Lakanmi episode laid the foundation for how rights would be
interpreted and enforced. Thereafter, the military routinely curtailed the
ability of everyday Nigerians to access justice. "Pre-action notices"-or the
requirement of litigants to submit documentation of their grievances to a
state agency before being allowed to commence their lawsuit 47-became a
regular feature of the legal system. While this procedure is not uncommon
within various democratic countries, the military's use of it had the effect
of chilling individuals from filing lawsuits. Relatedly, military orders
known as "public officers protection decrees" insulated state officials from
civil or criminal liability and defamation.48  And overall, as Max Siollun
has noted, a pervasive "[c]oup [c]ulture"49 enmeshed Nigerian society,
whereby the military authoritatively adhered to the maxim that it "could do
no wrong."o
Interestingly though, as Osagha argues, a converse phenomenon
simultaneously existed-precisely because it held power, the military also
could not only be one-dimensional autocrats.51 The military saw itself as
both the "saviour and guardian of the nation. . . invited to play this role by
various sections of the aggrieved public . . . ."52 Whether real or imagined,
this was the rhetorical garb military rulers employed, and as a result there
43. See E.O. LAKANMI & ORS v. The Attorney-General (West) & ORS, (1970) LPELR-
SC.58/69; For an excellent discussion of this case, see OKO, supra note 11, at 240-243.
44. Id. OKO, supra note 11, at 240-243.
45. Id. OKO, supra note 11, at 240-243.
46. See OKO, supra note 11, at 240-243; See also Faculty of Law, Analysis of Lakanmi v. AG
Western States, UNIVERSITY OF UYO (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://magnajurisuyo.wordpress.com/2016/12/27/analysis-of-lakanmi-v-ag-western-states/ (noting that
this decree of the federal military government was known as the Federal Military Government's
Supreme and Enforcement of Powers Degree, No. 28 of 1970.)
47. See Ani Comfort Chinyere, The Uwais Court: The Supreme Court and the Challenge ofLegal
Development, NIALS LAGOS (2006) https://legalpediaonline.com/sample-message-l/.
48. See LUKE UKA UCHE, MASS MEDIA, PEOPLE, AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA 126-131 (1989).
49. See SIOLLUN, supra note 1.
50. See G. Omo Arishe, Reconsidering Executive Immunity under the Nigeria Constitution,
NIGERIAN CURRENT L. REv. 274, 275 (2007-2010) (drawing upon the classic English feudalistic notion
of the king not being able to do anything wrong.).
51. See OSAGHE, supra note 42, at 54-90.
52. Id at 54.
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were policy spaces that the respective regimes believed they needed to
address (or be seen to address).5 3
Enter the formation of the Legal Aid Council. This body came into
existence as a result of the passage of the Legal Aid Act (1976), which was
pushed for by a group of civically minded lawyers, many of whom worked
as public defenders.54 Drawing on the work of their predecessors in the
1960s," these activists carefully, but forcefully, agitated for a statute that
empowered the Council to provide representation and assistance to certain
classes of criminal defendants.56 Furthermore, to safeguard against the
potential for abuse by patrons of the state (who did not need the assistance),
the process provided such legal aid only to those who lived below a
prescribed income." And more comprehensively, the spirit of the Act, and
those within civil society who vigorously promoted it, helped shape the
meaning of legal aid to include the "rendering [of] legal services through
consultation, advice, or [italics added] representation in court."" In other
words, legal aid did not simply mean litigation, but it included the range of
non-litigation activities in which lawyers regularly engage. In fact, aspects
of the Act permeated the subsequent 1979 and 1999 constitutions, as will
be discussed below.
Nevertheless, the presence of the military dictatorship hobbled the Act
in different ways. Members of the Council who were in charge of
enforcing the Act were understandably wary of how far they could
challenge the government. Additionally, there was always the issue of
53. Id at 54-58.
54. See Ojama Akor, Developing Legal Aid Strategies for Poor Nigerians, PRESSREADER.COM
(Aug. 19, 2004) https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20140819/282325383136021; For
more on the history of LAC, see Historical Profile of the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, LEGAL AID
COUNCIL (May 22, 2017) http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/profile; PENAL
REFORM INTERNATIONAL AND BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW, ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE IN AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 117
(2007).
55. See Akor, supra note 54 (noting that under this theory, Nigerian constitutionalism was seen as
"mandat[ing] a legal scheme in Nigeria").
56. See Latham & Watkins, Pro Bono Practices and Opportunities in Nigeria Excerpt from: A
Survey ofPro Bono Practices and Opportunities in Selected Jurisdictions, PRO BONO INSTITUTE, (Sept.
2010) http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/nigeria.pdf; David McQuoid-Mason,
Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Services Corps Public Defenders to Expand the Services of
the Legal Aid Council, 47 J. AFR. L. 107, 111 (2003); As McQuoid-Mason writes, in citing Schedule 2
of the Act, the "Legal Aid Council may provide legal aid for the following offences under the Criminal
Code: (i) murder of any degree; (ii) manslaughter; (iii) maliciously or willfully wounding or inflicting
grievous bodily harm; (iv) assault occasioning actual bodily harm (v) common assault; (vi) affray; (vii)
stealing; and (viii) rape." Id at 111-112.
57. See McQuoid-Mason, supra note 56, at 110-111; Latham & Watkins, supra note 56, at 3 (both
sources noting that, in fact, a "means test" component existed, whereby applicants had to complete
paperwork in order to qualify. [Latham cites the McQuoid-Mason piece on this point.] Of course, this
posed a problem, because many of those most desperately in need of legal aid were illiterate and did not
have the ability to fulfill these paperwork requirements on their own.).
58. See Latham & Watkins, supra note 56, at 4.
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funding-there was never enough money provided by the government to
assist all those with legal needs." There was also discontent among many
within civil society who disdained how, in exchange for the passage of the
Act, military leaders were promised immunity upon their eventual
relinquishing of power to civilian control.60
Finally, it was difficult to populate the Council with sufficient numbers
of skilled, passionate lawyer-administrators who were needed to ensure that
the Act would be properly executed."1 In his work, David McQuoid-Mason
found that the Council relied upon four different groups to provide legal
aid: lawyers doing work on a pro bono basis, private lawyers who worked
"for a nominal fee,"62 lawyers staffed by the Council itself, and young
lawyers who were part of the National Youth Service Corps.63 Still, the
efforts of all of these groups combined could not provide structured,
continuous, or systematic legal assistance,64 proving that such aid was
atomistic and ad hoc at best.
65
IV. DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: 1979-1983
In 1979, the military, under General Olusegun Obasanjo, relinquished
power and ceded control of the government to civilian rule.66 Elections
were held that year, and Shehu Shagari was elected president of the Second
Republic of Nigeria.67 Shagari's victory brought great hope that human
rights and access-to-justice for all Nigerians would be on the forefront of
59. See OKO, supra note 11, at 207 (noting even further that historically: "The Council has been
unsuccessful in recruiting competent lawyers to help run the program a result of its poor financial
position.").
60. For this point on how military officials were granted immunity from prosecution upon leaving
office, see Arishe, supra note 50, at 280-283.
61. See OKO, supra note 11, at 207.
62. See McQuoid-Mason, supra note 56, at 113.
63. Id at 112-114. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) has been seen by some as one of the
only other positive aspects that came out of the military period. Started in 1973, the NYSC is a
program that requires university graduates to spend time working on cultural and social service projects
to benefit the needy. Young lawyers who participate in the NYSC also can engage in legal aid services
under the Act, but scholars such as McQuoid-Martin argue that they are underutilized. (Id at 113-114).
There has also been criticism that the program does not protect its service workers adequately, exploits
them, and that NYSC leaders (dating back to the time of the military) have not as meticulously overseen
the program as necessary. (See e.g, Hannah Onifade, NYSC Tragedies: The Nigerian Government is
Taking Advantage of Its Youth and this Has to Stop, VENTURESAFRICA.COM (Mar. 31, 2016)
http://venturesafrica.com/features/ripsamuelokonta-the-nigerian-governent-is-taking-advantage-of-its-
youths-and-it-must-stop/; Festus Owete, NYSC to Extort N800 Million from Corps Members, PREMIUM
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014) http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/168175-nysc-to-extort-n800-
million-from-corps-members.html).
64. See Jill Cottrell, The New Nigerian Legal Aid Decree, 22 J. AFR. L. 78, 79 (1978).
65. Id. For a discussion of this point more broadly in Africa, see OKO, supra note 11, at 408-410.
66. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at xvii, 201.
67. Id.
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the new president's agenda. Shagari had campaigned vigorously on the
platform of inclusiveness and embracing Nigeria's diversity and multi-
culturalism.6 In his inaugural address, Shagari proclaimed "that the slogan
of "One Nation, One Destiny" shall be translated into reality." 69
To the delight of many rights-activists, a new Constitution of 1979
emerged. American-style in nature, the constitution did away with the
British parliamentary system of government, adopting instead a U.S.-based
presidential model.70 Direct elections of the president were established, as
were 'separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. 7 1  Federalism also continued to be enshrined, as was an
affirmative set of principles mandating that the government secure and
promote the general welfare of its citizens.72
On this last point, legal aid, in particular, was formally incorporated
within the Fundamental Rights section of the constitution. Influenced by
68. See generally A. OKION OJIGBO, SHEHU SHAGARI: THE BIOGRPAHY OF NIGERIA'S FIRST
EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT (1982); DAVID WILLIAMS, PRESIDENT AND POWER IN NIGERIA: THE LIFE OF
SHEHU SHAGARI (1982); See also Shehu Shagari, Presidentail Inaugural Speech (Oct. 1, 1979)
https://nigerial960.wordpress.com/2013/06/10/inaugural-speech-of-president-shehu-shagari-on-
october-1-1979/.
69. See Inaugural Speech, supra note 68.
70. See The Constitution of Nigeria (1979) available at
http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/1979ConstitutionofNigeria.html. See
also, FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 198-199.
71. See The Constitution of Nigeria (1979) available at
http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/1979ConstitutionofNigeria.html. See
also, FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 198-199.
72. See The Constitution of Nigeria (1979) available at
http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/1979ConstitutionofNigeria.html. See
also, FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 198-199.
73. See The Constitution of Nigeria (1979), available at
http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/1979ConstitutionofNigeria.html. The
language of Section IV, Subsection 42 reads as follows:
"Special jurisdiction of High Court-and legal aid. (1) Any person who alleges that any of the
provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in
relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress. (2) Subject to the
provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and
determine any application made to it in pursuance of this section and may make such orders,
issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of
enforcement or securing the enforcing within that State of any right to which the person who
makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter. (3) The Chief Justice of Nigeria
may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes
of this section. (4) The National Assembly - (a) may confer upon a High Court such
powers in addition to those conferred by this section as may appear to the National
Assembly to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively
to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section; and (b) shall make provisions-
(i) for the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen of Nigeria where his right
under this Chapter has been infringed or with a view to enabling him to engage the services
of a legal practitioner to prosecute his claim, and (ii) for ensuring that allegations of
infringement of such rights are substantial and the requirement or need for financial or legal
aid is real."
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the Legal Aid Act of 1976, subsection 42 of the '79 document required that
the federal legislature ensure that "indigent"74 Nigerians be entitled to
receive legal aid whenever claiming a violation or needing protection of
their fundamental rights." Administratively, this provision delegated each
state's High Court to be in charge of handling the distribution of legal aid
to the needy.76
Additionally, rights-advocates believed that improving legal aid
involved reforming legal education within the country. If Nigeria was to
become a respected power, it needed to develop a strong cohort of lawyers
who believed in the rule of law. Legal education had suffered significantly
during the military era, so in order to train the next generation of lawyers
skilled in a range of legal services-including representing the needy-law
schools in the country had to be revamped.
This argument harkened back to a project that had operated
immediately in the years following independence. Between 1962 and
1967, the government had invited the American-based philanthropic
organization, the Ford Foundation, to come to Nigeria to work with local
academics to strengthen the quality of legal training for students.7 7 Ford
labelled this program "SAILER"-Staffing of African Institutions of Legal
Education and Research 78--[em dash]and it focused on three key
educational institutions: the Lagos Law Faculty, the Ife Law Faculty, and
Zaria-Ahmadu Bello University's Institute of Administration. In short,
the SAILER project involved hiring mainly recent American law school
graduates who, upon invitation by different Anglo-phonic African
governments (including Nigeria), travelled to these respective countries'
law schools. Upon arriving, they helped create legal courses, prepare
treatises, teach research and writing classes, and establish clinics and
access-to-justice programs-all with the purpose of developing well-
rounded lawyers sensitive to grassroots causes.so However, with the
military coup in 1966, the SAILER project came to an end shortly
thereafter."
74. Id at (4)(b)(i-ii).
75. Id.
76. Id at §42.
77. See generally, Jayanth K Krishnan, Academic SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts
to Shape Legal Education in Africa, 1957-1977, 52 AM. J. L. HISTORY 261 (2012).
78. Id.
79. See Krishnan, supra note 77, at 284-285.
80. See Krishnan, supra note 77 (noting how the SAILER project involved the following countries:
Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia, and
how at law faculties within each of these states, the foreign lawyers who came were mainly from the
U.S. and were welcomed warmly by their respective African hosts. As time passed though, the SAILER
program had to scale itself back due to political instability within each of these countries, but some
forty years later, it remains a positively viewed program by those who participated in it).
81. Id. at 284-285, 306-312.
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Optimists hoped that Shagari would support a state-led initiative
reinstituting certain objectives Ford had with SAILER. F. Olisa Awogu's
contemporaneous treatment of how law, politics, and society interacted
during this Second Republic shows that a different approach instead was
taken.82 Rather than focusing on legal education and building a cohort of
"bottom-up" lawyers, the government believed that the best way Nigerians
could enjoy the fundamental rights guaranteed to them was if legal aid
came from the top-down-mainly from the courts.83 Civil society activism
remained fractured and under-funded. In order for substantive relief to
occur on a wider basis, the Nigerian judiciary had to take the lead, which is
what in fact occurred, and which also included going against the
government itself.84
For example, in Shugaba Abdurraham Darman v. The Federal
Minister of Internal Affairs & Ors," the government had ordered the
petitioner in this case to be deported to the country of Chad for being a
non-citizen who was threatening Nigeria's national security." In reality,
Darman was a popular politician from the northeast of Nigeria who had
been an opponent to President Shagari, and the deportation order was
widely seen as politically motivated.87 A state High Court, an intermediate
Court of Appeal, and then the Nigerian Supreme Court all ruled that
Darman's due process rights had been violated and that the deportation
should be stayed.8 According to the Supreme Court, the government's
case was a sham, with the prosecution failing to provide Darman with the
most basic means to defend himself.89
It is worthwhile noting that Darman brought his claim forward by
relying on a crucial set of "Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure)
Rules"9 0 that were devised by then Chief Justice of the Nigerian Supreme
Court, Atanda Fatayi-Williams." These rules operationalized and
82. See F. OLISA AwOGU, THE JUDICIARY IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, 1979-1983
(1984).
83. Id. at 117-118 (discussing how the Constitution of 1979 empowered the federal National
Assembly to take the lead in formulating the country's legal aid policy. At the time Awogu was writing
his book, the Assembly had not yet acted.).
84. Id. at 109-119.
85. See Shugaba Abdurraham Darman v. The Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & Ors (1981) 1
N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 1; See also discussion cited in AWOGU, supra note 82, at 111.
-86. See Shugaba Abdurraham Darman v. The Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & Ors (1981) 1
N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 1; See also discussion cited in AWOGU, supra note 82, at I11.
87. See Shugaba Abdurraham Darman v. The Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & Ors (1981) 1
N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 1; See also discussion cited in AWOGU, supra note 82, at 111.
88. See Shugaba Abdurraham Darman v. The Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & Ors (1981) 1
N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 1; See also discussion cited in AWOGU, supra note 82, at 111.
89. See Shugaba Abdurraham Darman v. The Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & Ors (1981) 1
N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 1; See also discussion cited in AWOGU, supra note 82, at 111.
90. See AWOGU, supra note 82, at 111.
91. Id
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facilitated the way claimants could apply for relief from a court.9 2  With
these procedural rules, the Chief Justice's goal was to provide immediate
legal aid for claimants.9 3
In another landmark judgment-Major Ladejobi v. Attorney General of
the Federation94--the Court reaffirmed the presence of the Rules as an
entitlement-facilitation device. It then went a step further by stating that
the Rules were not "the only mode of procedure available under the
Constitution of 1979 for the enforcement of fundamental rights."
Petitioners could seek legal protection by simply pointing to the language
of the fundamental rights itself, without needing to worry about strictly
following the procedural rules at all.96 In other words, the Major Ladejobi
Court was primarily concerned with how best to ensure that needy
claimants could access their constitutional rights, regardless of the formal
procedures present.
Unfortunately, this period of judicial-led, rights-based protection came
to an end in December of 1983. Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton describe
the events that marked the culmination of the Shagari presidency. 9 As they
detail, because of his weak leadership style and insecurity, Shagari
succumbed to patronizing "prominent businessmen and old-guard career
92. Id.
93. A likely question to emerge is: what did these procedural rules entail? Awogu describes them
as encompassing: "no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement of a guaranteed
right was to be made unless leave for same had been granted by a court or judge[,] ... [and] the
application for leave must be made ex-parte, supported by a Statement setting out the name and
description of the Applicant, the relief sought, and the grounds on which the relief was sought . . . .
A[nd] [a]n affidavit must verify the facts relied on. In granting the leave, the court or judge may impose
terms as to security for costs." AWOGU, supra note 82 at 111. Yet, it is important to note that an early
court decision did not adhere to this intention. In John Folade v. Attorney General of Lagos, the Court
refused to allow the petitioner to use the Enforcement Rules to trigger a fundamental rights claim. The
Court ruled instead that the invocation of a more traditional (harder-to-meet) procedural doctrine had to
be followed. See John Folade v. Attorney General of Lagos State & Ors (1981) 2 N.C.L.R (Nigeria)
771; See also, discussion in AwoGU, supra note 82, at 113-114 (holding that Folade, who had been
detained for an unusually long period of time on charges of robbery, could not use the Enforcement
Rules to challenge his detention. Rather, the Court held that Folade had to pursue the more traditional
habeas corpus route for relief); See also Innocent Adikwu v. Federal House of Representatives (1982) 3
N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 563 ; Folade was effectively muted a year later by Bade Local Government v.
Bulama Mai Ardo., which held that not only must classic procedure give way to the Enforcement Rules,
but also that fundamental rights claims could be raised at any time during the litigation, even if the
particular claim was not brought at the start of the proceedings - typically a formal requirement of
English law. See Bade Local Government v. Bulama Mai Ardo (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 804; See
also discussion in AwOGU, supra note 82, at 115.
94. Major Ladejobi v. Attorney General of the Federation (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. (Nigeria) 563; See
also discussion in AWOGU, supra note 82, at 114.
95. See Major Ladejobi, supra note 94; See also AWOGU, supra note 82, at 1144.
96. See AwOGU, supra note 82, at 115 (arguing that "[t]he constitutional guarantee of rights clearly
serves a claimant as a shield if he finds in the guarantee [to be] an [independent] answer to his alleged
infraction of a public law.").
97. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 181-209.
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politicians,"98 while excluding groups who had historically been
marginalized, such as "students, academics, civil servants, and members of
labor unions . . . ."9 Rather than focusing on everyday Nigerians, the
Shagari administration engaged in huge government-subsidized
infrastructure projects that were doled-out to allies as a means of buying
political support."'o Eventually, civil society groups, along with the press
and religious organizations, demanded Shagari step down; and although he
proceeded to win the 1983 election, the boisterous, widespread calls against
his corrupt administration persuaded the military to depose him in
December of that year.101
Nigeria subsequently endured military rule for the next sixteen years.
This period was among the harshest in Nigeria's tumultuous history. But
significantly, issues of legal aid and access-to-justice did not disappear.
Instead, they took on a different, more quietly bottom-up character.
V. 1983-1999: REVERSION TO MILITARY RULE
A. Background
The sordid saga of the military period between 1983 and 1999 has been
previously documented.' 0 2 Briefly, following Shagari's dismissal, General
Muhammudu Buhari took power. 0 ' Buhari ruled until 1985 when he was
toppled by a coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida, who, while deemed
to be among the most corrupt of leaders in Nigeria, managed to stay in
power until 1993.104 In 1993, relatively free elections were held, ushering
in Nigeria's Third Republic. But the electoral outcome was soon thereafter
cancelled by Babangida, whose actions caused massive protests throughout
much of the country.os Eventually, Babangida relinquished power to his
aide, Ernest Shonekan, but Shonekan was deposed in November of 1993 by
General Sani Abacha, who has been seen by many to be Nigeria's most
98. Id. at 201.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 202-205.
101. Id. at 205-209 (noting that "electoral fraud in this case was undeniable, and an electoral
tribunal eventually overturned the result ... [although] opposition forces were unable to prevent the
inauguration .. .on October 1, 1983.") Id. at 207.
102. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 209-235.
103. See Shehu Othman, Classes, Crises and Coup: The Demise of Shagari's Regime, 83 AFRICAN
AFFAIRS 441, 441 (1984).
104. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 216-229; See DAN AGBESE, IBRAHIM BABANGIDA:
THE MILITARY, POLITICS, AND POWER IN NIGERIA (2012).
105. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 226-228. The winner of the 1993 election was M.K.
Abiola who defeated Bashir Tofa. See AGBESE, supra note 104.
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vicious ruler since independence.1 06 Abacha's reign lasted until the
summer of 1998, when he was found dead at his home in Abuja.' 0 7 As
Section VI discusses, the following year Nigeria transitioned to its Fourth
Republic, which still remains to this day.
Predictably, with all the political tumult occurring between 1983 and
1999, legal aid, access-to-justice, and concerns for individual rights were
low priorities for state institutions. The case of the famous musician, Fela
Kuti, only reaffirms this point. Throughout the 1970s, Kuti was a social
activist and critic of that era's military regime.os In 1977, Kuti's family
home and personal property were destroyed by military officials. 109 He
sued the regime for damages, and the case languished in the courts for
years. Initially, the High Court of Lagos dismissed Kuti's claim, with the
Court of Appeal agreeing with this outcome.110 Finally, in 1984-less than
one year into the new military government-the Supreme Court heard the
matter. The Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded
Kuti from pursuing his case, and that there could be no "liab[ility] for
actions in tort committed by [the government or] its servants acting on its
behalf.""' Unlike its willingness during the second democratic republic to
serve as the leader in protecting individual rights, the Court now appeared
to buckle to the pressures imposed by the military in denying Kuti the
opportunity to access justice through the legal process. The Court's docile
stance, so early on during this latest period of authoritarianism, greatly
worried those working within civil society.
Fortunately, as O.C. Okafor has written, rights-activism was energized
in 1987 with the birth of the prominent Civil Liberties Organization
(CLO).11 2 The CLO and the "NGO community ... [more broadly] enjoyed
a modest measure of success (an achievement that is largely attributable to
its dynamism, creativity, and courage under successive military regimes)
. ".. 113 Other rights-based NGOs soon emerged and operated during the
Babangida and Abacha periods as a domestic response to widespread
106. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 228-230; See also Michael T. Kaufman, New
Chapter in Nigeria: The Obituary, Sani Abacha, 54, a Beacon of Brutality in an Era When Brutality
Was Standard, NEW YORK TIMES (Jun 9, 1998) http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/09/world/new-
chapter-nigeria-obituary-sani-abacha-54-beacon-brutality-era-when-brutality.html?mcubz=O.
107. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 234; Kaufman, supra note 106.
108. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 196.
109. See CHIEF DR. (MRS.) OLUFUNMILAYO RANSOME-KUTI & ORS. V. THE




111. Id. See also TEJUMOLA OLANIYAN, ARREST THE MUSIC! FELA AND HIS REBEL ART AND
POLITICS (2004).
112. See O.C. OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZINGHUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA 8 (2006).
113. Id. at 6.
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human rights abuses that were occurring in the country.11 4 Rather than
narrating the familiar story of foreign organizations and foreign actors
working as the main protagonists combatting authoritarian regimes, Okafor
details how it was the efforts of Nigerian lawyers and other local leaders
who served as the main advocates in trying to promote access-to-justice for
all Nigerians-for which there were some wins. 1 ' This narrative is
described next.
B. Civil Society Mobilization - The Efforts of the Civil Liberties
Organization
The CLO brought together civically minded, public-spirited lawyers
who sought to represent those tormented by the military regime." 6 In fact,
the CLO intentionally implemented a range of tactics that went beyond
litigation. Felix Morka, the deputy-director of the CLO during this time,
recounted a powerful story some years back explaining why.
[I]n 1990 ... Maroko, Nigeria's former largest slum community,
was demolished by the military government. ... [The residents]
were not consulted or given any notice, except an announcement
over the radio which gave them seven days to vacate their homes,
nothing else. The military government immediately ordered
bulldozers and soldiers and other security forces into the
community and completely wiped out that community from the
face of the earth....
[The] Civil Liberties Organisation .. . made spirited efforts to
actually get the courts to issue an injunction to restrain the
implementation of this brutal act. Of course, the Chief Judge. . . at
the time was clearly in cahoots with the government and would not
assign the case that I had filed to any court for adjudication,
knowing fully well the urgency of the matter. Although we made
oral arguments to impress on the judge the need to assign this
matter, he did not. It wasn't until the demolition actually began to
occur and we returned to the court that he assigned the case, by
which time, of course, it was too late. That is a typical example of
how the courts were used during the military system to undermine
the rule of law and access to justice."
114. Id. at 5-6, 12-51.
115. Id. at 151-209, 239-245.
116. Id. at 15-18, 52-54.
117. See Frank Upham et al., Issues of Concern to Developing and Transitional Countries, 24
FORDHAM INT'L. L. J. 317, 326 (2000).
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Therefore, the CLO had to engage in tactics such as street protests,
public awareness campaigns, educational seminars, and the publication of
provocative (but thoroughly researched and documented) literature-
including two circulars that were distributed widely and highlighted the
various human rights abuses being committed by the military.1 18 The CLO
even lobbied government officials and civil servants. 119 In 1990, from this
pressure it received, the military updated the 1976 Legal Aid Act. 120 M.A.
Banire, a CLO-supporter and still a prominent lawyer in Lagos today, noted
at the time that the new legislation was certainly an "improvement." 1 2 1
Given the CLO's cynical views towards the Nigerian courts,1 22 perhaps
not surprisingly the group sought another venue in which to pursue their
legal claims: the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. 12 3
The African Commission allowed for individuals or organizations wishing
to pursue claims against signatory-states of the identically named African
Charter to bring their cases to it.124  And indeed, the CLO was a leading
118. See CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANISATION, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA -
1990, 41-47 (1990); CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANISATION, EXECUTIVE LAWLESSNESS IN THE BABANGIDA
REGIME - A REPORT OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANIZATION, NIGERIA (March 1991).
119. See OKAFOR, supra note 112 at 15-18.
120. Legal Aid Act (1990).
121. See M.A. Banire, Legal Aid in the Administration ofJustice in Nigeria, CURRENT THEMES IN
NIGERIAN LAW (1.0. Agbede & E.O. Akanki, eds., 1997), Section III,
http://mabandassociates.com/pool/LegalAid intheadminof justice Nigeria.pdf. At the same time,
Banire (a Senior Advocate of Nigeria) also believed that the new law had defects, including the
following: only the poorest of the poor were eligible for government legal aid; that government legal
aid covered too narrow of criminal and civil cases; there was too heavy a government representation on
the Legal Aid Council and too little representation by members of civil society; there was too little
transparency in what the Council did; and the government insufficiently funded civil society
organizations to carry out the representation of those who were in desperate need of legal aid. Legal Aid
Act (1990).
122. One key reason for this cynicism was the lack of a "social action litigation" culture in Nigeria.
See S.A. Agbakwa & O.C. Okafor, Social Action Litigation and Access-to-Justice in Nigeria: A Critical
Case Study in JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: ACCELERATING ACCESS (A. Dias and G. H. Welch eds.
2009) (drawing on Upendra Baxi's coining of this phrase to argue that although attempts during the
military period were made by civil society organizations to effectuate change through this type of court-
action, success was limited. As the authors argue, even today, for social action litigation in Nigeria to
make a sustained difference, there needs to be the following: empowering ofjudges to deliver more in
the way of remedies to needy claimants; funding civil society organizations at greater levels;
encouraging cross border cooperation between civil society activists in Nigeria and in places such as
India; promoting technology as a means of offering increased levels of legal aid to more people; and
creating incentives for more private sector lawyers to engage in pro bono legal services. (See id. at 246-
253.)
123. It emerged as a result of the passage of the 1981 African Charter of Human and People's
Rights.
124. See African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981), Article 45. Note, in addition to
hearing and adjudicating these cases, the Commission, in 2004 (under a 1988 amendment/protocol to
the Charter) began preparing cases of its own to be presented in front of the African Court of Human
and People's Rights. This particular Court is meant to complement the Commission. See also,
Welcome to the African Court, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS,
http://www.african-court.org/en/.
216 The Journal of the Legal Profession [Vol. 42:2
party that came before the Commission in several key matters during the
1990s. 125
For example, one landmark case involved the military's detention of
political opponents in 1991.126 The opponents were eventually released the
following year, and the military argued that its decision relieved it from any
liability to the petitioners.1 27  However, the Commission rejected this
argument, holding that the military was not insulated. 128 In another case,
the Commission held that individuals who were held for three years in
custody by the military without a trial were deprived of their due process
rights under Article 6 of the African Charter. 129 And a few years later,
during the dictatorship of Sani Abacha, the Commission once again sided
with political opponents who had been sentenced to death.130 The
Commission held that Articles 7(1)(a) and (c) of the Charter-which require
the right to appeal, sufficient time to mount a defense, and legal
representation of the defendants' choice-all had been ignored by the
Abacha regime.13 '
125. Note, procedurally the typical manner in which a party could appear before the Commission
would be to exhaust all domestic court appearances first. The Commission reaffirmed this principle,
coincidentally, in a case involving the CLO. See Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 45/90,
(Aft. Comm Human and Peoples' Rights 1994).
126. See Communication No. 67/91, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (Amicable Resolution),
adopted at the 14th Ordinary Session of the Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Dec. 1993. This case
is discussed in Chidi A. Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures ofthe African Commission on
Human and People's Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359
(1998) (noting: "In another case, the Commission similarly affirmed that 'the release of the alleged
victims does not nullify any violation of the victims' rights."'). The reply of the government on May 19,
1992 (disclosing that the victims had been released) "does not absolve it of the liability in respect of any
violations that may have occurred." Communication No. 67/91, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria
(Amicable Resolution), adopted at the 14th Ordinary Session of the Commission, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, Dec. 1993." Id. at fn 95).
127. See Communication No. 67/91, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (Amicable Resolution),
adopted at the 14th Ordinary Session of the Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Dec. 1993; See also
Odinkalu, supra note 126, at fn 95; Communication No. 67/91, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria
(Amicable Resolution), adopted at the 14th Ordinary Session of the Commission, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, Dec. 1993." Id. at fn 95).
128. See Communication No. 67/91, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (Amicable Resolution),
adopted at the 14th Ordinary Session of the Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Dec. 1993; See also
Odinkalu, supra note 126, at fn 95; Communication No. 67/91, Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria
(Amicable Resolution), adopted at the 14th Ordinary Session of the Commission, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, Dec. 1993." Id. at fn 95).
129. See Communication 102/93, Constitutional Rights Project & Civil Liberties Organization v.
Nigeri; See also the Commission's decision in Constitutional Rights Project v. The President of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and 5 Others, Suit No. M/102/93 (originating in the High Court of Lagos
State of Nigeria) (1993) (holding that six defendants who were sentenced to death for crimes they were
convicted of should have their convictions vacated because of the military violating their due process
rights. As Odinkalu described in his account of the case, the defendants were released by the military in
1996-years after the Commission's ruling. See Odinkalu, supra note 126, at 402-403.)
130. Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v.
Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 218/98 (1998).
131. Id.
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The Commission was active in other separate but related areas as well.
One of its most noteworthy judgments involved Article 10 of the Charter,
where the Commission ruled that government opponents, represented by
the CLO, were entitled to: associate with one another, collectively
congregate, and seek redress in court when they had legal grievances
against.the state.132 In another CLO-led case, the Commission held that the
military could not unilaterally declare that the Charter did not apply in the
Nigerian domestic context, nor could judicial review be removed from the
Nigerian courts, nor could political parties be banned from challenging the
government in court.133 The Commission held that if the military wanted to
extract itself from its human rights obligations, it had to adhere to specific
principles set forth in the Charter, such as providing timely notice to the
other member states.134 And in two other key decisions, the Commission
sided with the CLO-one in which an opposition newspaper was deemed to
have the right under the Charter to stay open,135 and the other where the
military was found to have improperly stacked the Nigerian Bar
Association with over three-quarters of its own appointees.' 36
Yet, arguably no case was as high-profile for the CLO than when it and
a coalition of partners represented a brilliant writer and environmental
activist from the Niger Delta region-Kenule B. Saro-Wiwa. This story is
discussed next.
C. The Saro-Wiwa Case and the Broader Challenges for-and Criticisms
of-the NGO Sector
The Niger Delta region has long been the epicenter for debate, discord,
and uprisings.' Okafor explains that the combination of long-standing
discrimination against the indigenous Ogoni people, coupled with the oil
and natural resources exploitation by multinational conglomerates, has
132. Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, African Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights, Comm. 101/93,
P 14, 8th ACHPR AAR Annex VI (1994-1995), available at http://
www.worldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisionns/1995.03_CivilLiberties_Organisation.
v_NigeriaARO8.htm.
133. Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria Communication No. 129/94, 9th Activity Report 1995-
1996, available at.www.achpr.org.
134. Id. (ruling that absent this adherence, the Charter's effect on Nigeria's domestic context would
remain.).
135. Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Comm. 140/94, 141/94,
145/95 (1999).
136. 101/93 Civil Liberties Organization in respect of the Nigerian Bar Association vs. Nigeria.
(...noting "the Civil Liberties Organization['s]... Protest against the Legal Practitioners' Decree. This
decree establishes a new governing body of the Nigerian Bar Association, namely the Body of
Benchers. Of the 128 members of this body, only 31 are nominees of the Bar Association. The rest are
nominees of the government ... [and then holding] that there has been a violation of Articles 6, 7, and
10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.")
137. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 39-41.
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fueled the disharmony.138 In 1990, an organization known as the Movement
for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was founded by Ken Saro-
Wiwa. 13 9
From its inception, MOSOP argued that international companies had
failed to address the Ogoni people's needs.140 Saro-Wiwa distrusted the
military and saw the regime as only concerned with financially lining its
pockets from the profits these companies produced.141 Saro-Wiwa sought to
undermine the alliance between these companies and the military and to
champion environmental and socio-economic justice for those living in this
area. 142
Saro-Wiwa's strategic populism, not surprisingly, earned the ire of the
military. Under the Babangida government, Saro-Wiwa was imprisoned for
a period of time in 1992.143 He was detained again the following year.1 44
The turning point came in 1994 after four Ogoni men-who had been
opponents of MOSOP - were murdered. 145 Sani Abacha, who was in power
by then, accused Saro-Wiwa and eight others of the killings and prosecuted
them in a military tribunal.1 4 6 Several groups, such as International Pen,
the Constitutional Rights Project, Interights, and the CLO,147 came to the
defense of the "Ogoni nine."1 48  Having the CLO on board was critical.
Okafor describes how a few years prior "a massive campaign by the
[Organization] . . . was one of the critical pressure points that persuaded the
military government of the time to commute the death sentences [of other
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id at 40; See also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at xxxi, 231-232, 239.
141. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 40; See also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at xxxi, 231-232,
239.
142. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 40; See also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at xxxi, 231-232,
239.
143. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 40; See also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at xxxi, 231-232,
239.
144. See Jon Henley, Nigerian Activist Ken Saro-Wiwa's Daughter Remembers Her Father, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2011) https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/dec/31/noo-saro-wiwa-
kens-daughter-nigeria.
145. See also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at xxxi, 231-232, 239; See also ROY DORON
&TOYIN FALOLA, KEN SARO-WIWA 126 (2016).
146. See also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 231-232; DORON & FALOLA, supra note 145. at
126; OKO supra note 11, at 230-239.
147. See International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa
Jr. and Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS (Oct. 31, 1998) available at http://
.www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6123.html.
148. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 102 (noting how "[tihe CRP [Constitutional Rights Project]
and a number of other groups also worked tirelessly (albeit unsuccessfully) to prevent the execution of
Ken Saro-Wiwa and the rest of the Ogoni nine.")
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separate defendants] . .. .,."149 Thus, the CLO had on-point experience in
this area of defense litigation.
Sadly, Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues lost their case. The Ogoni nine
were convicted, and in 1995 they were executed, resulting in domestic and
international outrage.15 o In their new book on Saro-Wiwa's life, Roy
Doron and Toyin Falola show that the Shell Corporation-the major
extractive industry in this region at the time-was also complicit in this
miscarriage of justice.15 ' Shell, according to the authors, sought the
protection of the military, which it knew engaged in human rights
abuses.' 52 In fact, the authors examine the civil case brought by Saro-
Wiwa's son and other plaintiffs in U.S. federal court (under the Alien Tort
Claims Act) against Shell for collusion with the government in the
execution of the Ogoni nine.153 This matter ultimately settled with Shell
paying the plaintiffs $15.5 million in what it called a "humanitarian
gesture."1 54  Even though an American non-profit, the Center for
Constitutional Rights, brought the case against Shell in the United States,155
had it not been for the efforts of the Nigerian NGOs, (including the CLO),
this settlement would never have occurred.' 5 6
This last point is important to remember in light of the critiques made
against civil society groups in Nigeria over the years. As background,
several scholars have expressed concern about the operations, agenda,
leadership, and transparency of the Nigerian NGO sector. There are the
frequently made derisive comments that these NGOs are too urban or
Lagos-based; that the leaders are more focused on issues tied to cities
rather than the countryside; and that the groups are too beholden to foreign
149. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 179; 102, noting the efforts of the CRP, which Okafor
especially lauds.
150. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 231-232; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 40.
151. See DORON & FALOLA, supra note 145, at 79-98.
152. Id.





it&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection (discussing also the charges of how Shell
flouted environmental laws). See also, two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542
U.S. 692 (2004) (providing limitations on the types of claims that can brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (further narrowing Sosa by
noting that the presumption is that the ATCA does not apply outside of the United States.); See also
DORON & FALOLA, supra note 145, at 155 (noting that the Kiobel case "effectively ended lawsuits such
as those brought by Saro-Wiwa's family and [other Ogoni claimants, including] Kiobel." Id. at 154.).
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funders who dictate policymaking decisions.1 s7 Another common criticism
is that too often Nigerian organizations are used simply as vehicles by self-
aggrandizers who are more interested in gaining access to resources,
power, and prestige, than concentrating on alleviating the plight of those
most in need."ss As that argument goes, because of their intense self-
interest, such leaders care little about developing a sound infrastructure for
the organization or the organization's cause, with the consequence being
that when these leaders depart, the organization typically folds and the
problems of the oppressed remain unresolved.159 The result then in Nigeria
is an NGO space that is fragmented and disorganized and filled with groups
who fail to advance the interests of the very constituents they claim to
represent.1 60
Among the groups that is seen as embodying many of these problems is
the CLO. According to the critics, the CLO has struggled to maintain focus
and cohesion,1 61 and the result has been the departure of several officials
who have formed competing organizations.1 62  Moreover, the inability of
the group to develop sound and sustained financial footing, even after all
these years, has also been noted as a weakness, along with the perpetual
disconnect the central leadership has with those at the grassroots level. 163
Tactically, the CLO has been chided for engaging in the "negative
proclamation[s]" 164 of human rights violations, rather than embracing
157. Makau Mutua, Domestic Human Rights Organizations in Africa: Problems and Perspectives,
22 J. OPINION 30-33 (1994); Alex de Waal, Human Rights Organizations and the Political Imagination:
How the West and Africa Have Diverged, J. HUMAN. RIGHTS 475 (2003); Chidi A. Odinkalu, Why More
Africand Don't Use Human Rights Language, HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE 3 (2000); Makau Mutua,
Human Rights and Politics in Africa: Democratizing the Rights Discourse, 1 EAST AFRICAN J. PEACE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 250 (1993); OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 77-150; Shedrack Gutto, Non-
Governmental Organizations, People's Participation and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights: Emerging Challenges to Regional Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES YEARBOOK: 1991 (B. Andreassen & T. Swineheart eds., 1992).
158. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 77-150; Matua, supra note 157; Odinkalu, Why More, supra note
157; Makau Mutua, A Discussion on the Legitimacy of Human Rights NGOs in Africa, AFRICA LEGAL
AID QUARTERLY 28 (Oct-Dec. 1997).
159. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 77-150; Matua, supra note 157; Odinkalu, Why More, supra note
157; Makau Mutua, A Discussion on the Legitimacy of Human Rights NGOs in Africa, AFRICA LEGAL
AID QUARTERLY 28 (Oct-Dec. 1997); See also Joe Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric:
Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
160. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 77-150; Matua, supra note 157; Odinkalu, Why More, supra note
157; Mutua, A Discussion, supra note 158; Matua, Domestic Human Rights, supra note 157; Oloka-
Onyango, supra note 159; Gutto, supra note 157.
161. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 18.
162. Id; A. Ikelegbe, The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria, 39 J.
MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 1 (2001);
163. See OKAFOR , supra note 112, at 53.
164. See Tundi Abayomi, Non-Governmental Organizations in the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights in Africa: Critique of Approach and Methods, in PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(A.U. Kalu and Y. Osinbajo, eds., 1992). This is piece is cited, discussed, and ultimately disputed in
OKAFOR, supra note 112.
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positive, constructive rhetoric as well as tangible strategies to improve
access-to-justice opportunities for Nigerians.
Additionally, there has been criticism of the CLO's international
partnerships. 165  In these relationships, skeptics have seen the benefits-
arrow pointing in favor of the international partner. 16 6 For example, the
CLO has provided information on the Nigerian human rights landscape to
foreign donors and the embassies of select countries. 167 These entities then
go on to determine - with little guidance from the CLO - which domestic
partners should receive funding and the policy directions these partners
should follow. 168  Another CLO-partnership that has received critical
scrutiny is the one it has with a government agency created under, of all
leaders, Sani Abacha: the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission
(NHRC). 169  The CLO, along with other NGOs, has worked with the
NHRC, since its inception. In doing so, however, a repeated question is
whether this cooperation has lent credibility to an institution - particularly
during those military years - only concerned with human rights in name
rather than in substance.' 70 As such, the independence and integrity of the
CLO has been placed into doubt by critics.
In the final section, there will be a rebuttal to these criticisms, a defense
of the CLO, and an evaluation of the impact it has had on human rights.
An important part of this discussion includes the ways in which the CLO
helped shape the resistance efforts during the military era. Indeed, because
of the CLO and other NGOs, the military ultimately relinquished power in
1999.
VI. RESPONSES, TRANSITIONS, AND GAINS MADE
A. Answering the Critics
The above criticisms of the Nigerian NGO sector are valuable. They
serve as a reminder that there are communities whose needs remain unmet
and that those who hold power, even in the NGO space, need to have
checks placed on them. At the same time, however, criticisms. can be
excessive - even the most well-intentioned ones.
165. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 93-94.
166. Id.
167. Id; See also BONNY IBHAWOH, HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA: AN APPRAISAL
REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO COMMUNITY IN NIGERA (2001) (as also discussed by OKAFOR,
supra note 112, at 188.)
168. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 93-94, 188; IBHAWOH, supra note 167.
169. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 183; OKO, supra note 11, at 227; See also, NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/index.php.
170. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 183; OKO, supra note 11, at 227; See also, NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 169.
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Consider, for example, the cases described above that were brought by
the CLO. For that type of litigation to be successful, there was an absolute
need for the CLO to have sophisticated leaders familiar with how to
operate within the domestic judiciary, as well as the African Commission -
both of which, admittedly, were far removed from the grassroots. Of
course, it is easy to deride these legal victories as being "hollow."71
Questioning the tangible effects judicial rulings have on ordinary people
has a long history in the academic and activist literature, beyond Nigeria.172
Yet offering this criticism without considering the nuanced impact that
such cases can have on an issue ignores the complexities of such "cause
lawyering."173
The Saro-Wiwa case highlights this point. Recall, well before the Shell
Corporation settled the case brought in the American courts, there was
litigation that occurred in Africa. CLO lawyers, together with their
coalition partners, tirelessly fought on behalf of Saro-Wiwa in the domestic
tribunals and in the African Commission.17" These groups saw this
litigation not just as a legal tactic, but political as well. As Michael
McCann in his classic work on American courts has argued, litigation can
serve as the venue to raise public consciousness, introduce new rhetoric to
the discourse, and alter a political narrative that is being dominated by a
political hegemon - in this case, the different Nigerian military leaders in
171. For the classic work, in the U.S. context, on this point: See generally GERALD ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
172. Id. See e.g., JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION
(1982); SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS
(1984); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). For a general summary of this literature, See
Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575
(2006). C.f, MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994) [hereinafter MCCANN, RIGHTS]; and
Michael McCann & Helen Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurement": A Relational Analysis ofSocial
Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Schieingold eds., 1998); Jayanth K.
Krishnan, Transgressive Cause Lawyering in the Developing World: The Case of India, in THE
WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE (Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds., 2005).
173. For a discussion of cause lawyers, See STUART SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING
To BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004) (citing the extensive
literature produced by Sarat and Schiengold, including their various edited cause lawyering volumes, on
this topic.); Also for a summary of this material, See Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause, supra note 172;
See also, Director of State Security Service v. Olisa Agbakoba and Another 3 NWLR 314 (1999)
(ruling that it is a fundamental right to travel and to have a passport to do so); For a discussion of how
this case was a transformative moment in that the judiciary "would not have even had the opportunity to
pronounce on this matter had it not been for the courage, perseverance, and skills of the NGO activists
who pursued the matter," See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 162.
174. See International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro- Wiwa
Jr. and Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, African




charge.175 Elite professionals, such as the lawyers in the Saro-Wiwa
coalition, may have directed the strategy of the organization. But contrary
to the critics' assertions, such actions should not be confused with these
elites being the primary beneficiaries of these efforts. In this case, the
layered legal aid strategies of the coalition ultimately led to: a) a favorable
judgment in an international tribunal, b) global condemnation of the
military and Shell, and c) a multi-million-dollar settlement for the Saro-
Wiwa family and the affected Ogoni communities. 17 6
This argument can be extended by adopting Okafor's subtle approach
towards NGOs and the larger access-to-justice context during the military
era. On the one hand, Okafor is not hesitant to paint the NGO sector, and
the CLO specifically, along the lines of the criticisms made above. 177 At
the same time, he recognizes that through their legal and political actions,
"NGOs were at the forefront of the campaign to end military rule . .. .""
And that "NGOs have had a modest but nevertheless important impact on
the content, character, and development of public discourse in Nigeria." 79
This concept of "modest but significant"8 0 impact underscores
Okafor's entire analysis and is persuasive for how best to evaluate the role
of NGOs during this military time. It is a straw-argument to claim that
NGO's in Nigeria were homogenous and were all elite-driven and elite-
focused. As Okafor copiously demonstrates, between 1987 and 2001, there
were nearly two dozen active groups operating in the country.18 ' Although
there were broad similarities in how these organizations functioned and
were structured, 18 2 they also each had unique aspects to them. Moreover,
these groups were not one-dimensional. They engaged in a combination of
tactics - litigation, legislative monitoring and drafting, international
outreach, awareness initiatives, educational efforts, and grassroots
mobilization - in order to increase their constituents' ability to better access
their rights. 183
Okafor spends a great deal of time assessing the CLO, in particular. To
reiterate, he was not hesitant to be critical. But Okafor was fair; he
175. See MCCANN, RIGHTS supra note 172. Also, see IBHAWOH, supra note 167; Also discussed in
OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 188).
176. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 192; DORON & FALOLA, supra note 145, at 153; Mouawad,
supra note 153.
177. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 126-128 (also noting how foreign funders negatively
influenced the CLO. As a counter to this pattern of being reliant on foreign funders, Okafor points to
"Gani Fawehinmi, Nigeria's most famous human rights activist" who refused to take almost any money
from abroad. Id at 143.)
178. Id. at 185.
179. Id. at 188.
180. Id. at 195.
181. Id. at 13-77.
182. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 69-71.
183. Id. at 77-123.
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recognized that the CLO practiced various tactics and at times did so
successfully. For example, while he wished that the group would have
addressed socioeconomic rights more in-depth, 18 4 he acknowledges that it
did publish key literature that had impact,' including bravely releasing "a
groundbreaking book-length report ... that captured the dehumanizing
conditions in Nigerian prisons"1 86 during the height of the Babangida
regime. Additionally, with offices throughout the country, the CLO was
able to create valuable alliances with other organizations in order to pursue
educational and grassroots tactics.' 87 And because of its reputational
legitimacy, the CLO and some of its coalition partners also played a role in
drafting rights-based pieces of legislation - a "remarkable feature ...
[especially] during the harshest days of military rule . . . .""'
In sum, the picture of the NGO sector in Nigeria, between 1983 and
1999, was complicated. Along with the criticisms made above, civil
society leaders also generally failed to more forcefully emphasize issues
relating to the rights of women, the environment, and socioeconomic
minorities.18 9 Regarding this last group, one area that has been especially
disappointing is the fact that LGBTQ communities then, and still today,
have not been embraced broadly by the NGO sector. Although, ten years
earlier, several groups, including the CLO, signed a petition arguing against
criminalizing same-sex relations,'" there have been disgraceful statements
made about what is seen as the "condemnable"l 9' behavior of LGBTQ
individuals - even from former CLO interim director Igho Akeregha.' 92
Thus, the NGO scene in Nigeria has been conflicted. The critics'
observations certainly warrant attention and have merit. At the same time,
aspects of the critiques are too blunt and too sweeping. Also, it is
important to remember that NGOs were deeply involved in moving
Nigeria from a military dictatorship to a democracy in 1999. In those
immediate years of the transition, certain NGOs were able to lobby the
184. Id. at 17.
185. Id. at 17 (noting also an "Annual Report [that] include[d] a column for its women's rights
projects, as well as an entry for its Niger Delta monitoring project . . . ."). See also, Id. at 173.
186. Id. at 80; See also, another report that it published in 1996, as noted by OKAFOR, supra note
112, at 90.
187. OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 52-54; 84-89.
188. Id. at 171,172-174.
189. Id. at 209-244.
190. This occurred in 2006 after General Obasanjo became President Obasanjo, in democratic
Nigeria. See Letter to President Obasanjo Regarding Bill to Criminalize Gay Rights, (March 22, 2006).
https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/03/22/letter-nigerian-president-obasanjo-regarding-bill-criminalize-
gay-rights.
191. See Dotun Ibiwoye, Gay Rights Controversy: A Gathering Storm over Cameron's Comments,





democratic government to commute the life sentences for prisoners
convicted by the aforementioned tribunals.1 93 Relatedly, within the first
two years of Nigeria's new democratic Fourth Republic, the CLO, in
particular, was influential in educating and professionalizing judges to
work in the rejuvenated court system.' 94 And CLO leaders also worked
with the NHRC, which helped legitimize this government agency.
(Coincidentally, one of the harshest critics of the NGO sector, Chidi
Odinkalu, was a former head of the CLO and then later the former head of
the NHRC).' 95
The transition to democracy occurred in 1999. The next section
examines the role NGOs have played in providing legal aid and rights-
based opportunities for ordinary Nigerians.
B. Access-to-Justice in the Early Years ofDemocratic Nigeria
In 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo returned to power in what was a relatively
peaceful election which, while not error-free, was deemed acceptable given
Nigeria's history. 19 6 Prior to this transition, the reign of Sani Abachi ended
with his surprising death in 1998.197 His successor, General Abdulsalami
Abubakar, took power but quickly realized that the demands for democracy
by civil society activists were too strong. He thus helped facilitate the
national elections that occurred less than a year later.198
After almost twenty years since the ushering-in of this Fourth
Republic, the empirical evidence shows that many needs continue to go
unmet. For example, Nigeria has not had the broad "social action
litigation" movement seen in other countries.' 99 There has not been an
activist judiciary marshalling widespread change through its decisions.200
Nor has it been easy (through, say, liberal standing requirements, low filing
fees, or plaintiff-friendly mechanisms) for litigants to enter into court.201
Litigants also have not been able to rely on the government to enforce
existing rights on the books.202
193. See OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 180.
194. Id. at 170.
195. Id. at 183. For an assessment of Odinkalu's tenure, see Tobi Soniyi, An Assessment of Chidi
Odinkalu's Four Years as Chairman, Governing Council, National Human Rights Commission, THIS
DAY (Mar. 2, 2016) https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/02/an-assessment-of-chidi-
odinkalus-four-years-as-chairman-governing-council-national-human-rights-commission/.
196. See FALOLA&HEATON, supra note 24, at 234-235.
197. Id. at 234 notes that Abacha died of "apparent heart attack."
198. Id. at 234.
199. See Agbakwa & Okafor, supra note 122.
200. Id. at 210-211.
201. Id. 211 (noting also that there has not been a judiciary-media coalition that work together to
promote claimants' rights.)
202. Id. at 211.
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Still, there were activists who continued using the courts after 1999 for
"strategic impact" 203 purposes. Such litigation involved advocating for
women, workers, defendants, and prisoners.2 04 These cases focused on
producing impact where possible.205 Broadly put, this litigation
concentrated on the civil and political rights of those in need, 2 06 and NGOs
litigating on behalf of these claimants did achieve a certain amount of
success.2 07 The major critique, however, remained: that these -campaigns
failed to provide widespread change for those at the grassroots level.208
Perhaps most indicative of this point was the labor-rights litigation that
occurred within the country. While there were some court victories, this
litigation effort did not translate into major transformation. 20 9  When
substantive change happened, it did so because of a set of social movement
strategies (beyond the courts) that involved everyday Nigerian workers.210
Yet the courts occasionally managed to issue judgments that positively
aided the masses. Take the complicated and cross-cutting case involving a
dispute between the state government of Lagos and President Obasanjo's
federal government.2 11 In 2004, the federal government suspended, what
had been until that time, mandated funding to the states under section 162
203. Id. 210.
204. See Agbakwa & Okafor, supra note 122, at 212.
205. Id. at 210.
206. Id. at 212, 220 (noting that less attention was paid to socio-economic rights.) An alternative
view of this point, however, is that that the historic divide between civil/political rights and socio-
economic rights is more illusory than it is stark - namely because of the inherent linkage between the
two sets. See generally Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots: Access-to-justice in
India's Lower Tier, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 151 (2014).
207. See Agbakwa & Okafor, supra note 122, at 221-230 (highlighting a number of civil and
political rights cases showing the success of this type of 'strategic impact litigation,' which while more
limited to its large impact vis-A-vis social action litigation, still has provided claimants with victories
and broader opportunities to access justice.)
208. Id. at 230-39.
209. For a detailed set of relevant readings, see Obiora C. Okafor, Remarkable Returns: The
Influence of Labour-Led Socio-Economic Rights Movement on Legislative Reasoning, Process and
Action in Nigeria, 1999-2007, 47 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 241 (2009) [hereinafter Okafor, Remarkable
Returns]; Obiora C. Okafor, Irrigating the Famished Fields: The Impact ofLabour-Led Struggles on
Policy and Action in Nigeria (1999-2007), 27 J. CONTEMP. AFRICAN STUD. 159 (2009) [hereinafter
Okafor, Irrigating the Famished Fields]; Obiora C. Okafor, Between Elite Interests and Pro-Poor
Resistance: The Nigerian Courts and Labour-Led Anti-Fuel Price Hike Struggles (1999-2007), 54
AFRICAN J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2010) [hereinafter Okafor, Between Elite Interests]; See also, Obiora C.
Okafor & Basil E. Ugochukwu, Inventing Legal Combat: Pro-Poor Struggles in the Human Rights
Jurisprudence of the Nigerian Appellate Courts, 1999-2011, 7 AFRICAN J. LEGAL STUD 429 (2014)
[hereinafter Okafor & Ugochukwu, Inventing Legal Combat] (noting that the appellate decisions
provided mixed results to poor litigants seeking redress).
210. See generally Okafor, Remarkable Returns, supra note 209; Okafor, Irrigating the Famished
Fields, supra note 209; Okafor, Between Elite Interests, supra note 209; Okafor & Ugochukwu,
Inventing Legal Combat, supra note 209.
211. See Att'y Gen. Attorney General of Lagos State v. Att'y Gen. of the Fed'n (2003) Federation,
6 SCNJ 24, (Nigeria) available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Attorney-
General%20of/o2oLagos%2oState%20V%2oAttorney-General%20of%2othe%2oFederation.htm.
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(4) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.212 The Lagos government objected
and sued, arguing that the denial of this funding prevented its local
governments from being able to work on key infrastructure projects
intended to benefit those most needy within the state.2 13 In response, the
federal government counter-claimed that because Lagos State had
reconfigured its constitutionally established "20 Local Government
Councils ... [by] replac[ing] [them] with 57,"214 it was no longer obliged
to fulfill this commitment.
Unable to reach a solution, the parties called upon the Supreme Court
to resolve the conflict. While the Court stated that the 57 new local
governments would only be able to receive the funding after the federal
"National Assembly passe[d] the appropriate Act," 215 it concluded that
"[t]he president has no power ... to suspend or withhold for any period
whatsoever the statutory allocation due and payable to [the] Lagos State
Government . . . ."216 The judgment was a clear victory not just for the
Lagos government, but for everyday constituents whose interests were
being advocated by their state representatives. It also demonstrated the
independence of the judiciary. The ability of the Court to stand up to the
president, who was once the military dictator of the nation, signaled the
progress that had been made.
The early years, following the restoration of democracy, saw another
important access-to-justice development as well. In 1999, Obasanjo
established a 'truth commission' for Nigeria.217 The commission had
different names, 218 but it soon came to be called the 'Oputa Panel,' named
for its chair, Chukwudifu Oputa, who was a retired justice of the Nigerian
Supreme Court.2 19 The Oputa Panel was charged with investigating all of
212. Id. ("Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among
the Federal and State Governments and the local government councils in each State on such terms and




216. See Att'y Gen. Attorney General of Lagos State v. Att'y Gen. of the Fed'n, supra note 211.
217. See Hakeem 0. Yusuf, Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission, The Oputa Panel
(Nigeria), in ENYCLOPEDIA OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 161, (Lavinia Stan and Nadia Nedelsky eds., 2013)
[hereinafter Human Rights]; Hakeem 0. Yusuf, The Judiciary and Political Change in Africa:
Developing Transitional Jurisprudence in Nigeria, 7 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 654 (2009) [hereinafter
Judiciary]; Hakeem 0. Yusuf, Travails of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria,
INT'L J. CONST. L. 268 (2007) [hereinafter Travails]; UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TRUTH
COMMISSION: NIGERIA (June 14, 1999), https://www.usip.org/publications/1999/06/truth-conmission-
nigeria; See also, ELISABETH GUAKER, A STUDY OF THE NIGERIAN TRUTH COMMISSION AND WHY IT
FAILED(Feb. 2009); OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 183.
218. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at
183.
219. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; United
States Institute for Peace, supra note 217; Guaker, supra note 217; Okafor, supra note 112, at 183.
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the human rights abuses that had occurred between 1966 and 1999.220 It
had investigative powers, such as the ability to call and cross-examine
witnesses, find on issues of fact and law, and issue recommendations to the
different branches of government. 22 1  The Panel's members also saw
themselves as serving on a cathartic body - one which would emotionally
help heal the wounds for those who had suffered so unjustly under the
previous regimes.22 2 Otherwise put, the members believed they were to
administer legal and moral judgments on past actions by the state and to
ensure that these abuses would never occur again.223
The Oputa Panel was a model of what several scholars have referred to
as 'transitional justice.' 2 24 The concept is that during a period when a state
is moving from a non-democratic to democratic system, it will seek to
implement mechanisms to assist a society deal with the human rights
abuses that occurred during the authoritarian period. 225 Transitional justice
bodies take on more than just a legal role; they have a political, economic,
and social character, and they possess both substantive and symbolic
significance.22 6 The creation of the Oputa Panel, thus, provided hope that
the new Nigerian government sincerely cared about transparency,
responsibility, accountability, and justice.
Unfortunately, the reality fell short of the aspirations. Aggrieved
claimants submitted, in total, some 10,000 petitions to the Panel, with
roughly 1-2% of these cases heard by its members. 227 The claims covered
atrocities that occurred over a thirty-year span. After writing a voluminous
report that contained policy recommendations and judgments, the Panel
was sued by members of the former military junta (including
220. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at
183.
221. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at
183.
222. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at
183.
223. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at
183.
224. For a discussion of this point, see RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
225. See Id. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217;
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note
112, at 183.
226. See TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) supra note 224; Human Rights, supra note 217;
Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note
217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at 183.
227. The numbers seem to vary depending on the sources. See Travails, supra note 217 (stating that
about 200 cases were chosen); GUAKER, supra note 217 (stating that about 200 cases were chosen);
U.S. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217 (stating that about 150 cases were selected).
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Babangida). 228 They argued that the federal government had no jurisdiction
to impose the Panel's recommendations on the states, because the states
had not been involved in the Panel's establishment nor had consented to its
powers. 29 The case was heard in the Nigerian Supreme Court, which
agreed with this argument and ruled that the Panel had been acting
unconstitutionally. 230  Soon thereafter, in January 2003, Obasanjo
dismantled the Panel and prohibited the public release of its report.23 1
To his critics, Obasanjo's creation of the Oputa Panel was nothing
more than pretext, and so his disassembling of it was not a surprise. In
fact, the Court's ruling gave him the perfect excuse to do away with all of
the Panel's work. Indeed, most disheartening was the role of the Court in
this episode. As Hakeem Yusuf has written, the justices failed to "utilize
the opportunity presented by Oputa Panel to contribute to the developing
jurisprudence on the right to truth for victims of gross human rights
violations." 23 2
The Court's equivocation towards the government - where it displayed
its willingness to exercise judicial strength in some cases, but then not in
others - exhibited the precarious position in which it saw itself during this
transitional period to democracy. For rights activists working in the
trenches, however, this ambivalence offered only cold comfort. Still, it is
worth noting that after the Oputa Panel case, Nigeria did not revert to
military rule. It has remained a democracy, albeit a- fragile one that
continues to wrestle with how best to address and respond to different
access-to-justice issues in these recent years.
C. Bits ofProgress . .. with Caveats
The lessons from above, highlighting the struggles of the NGO sector
during the military era and then in the early 2000s, apply to this day. Civil
society groups continue to face many of the same challenges - lack of
leadership and poor infrastructure, insufficient resources, pressure from
funders, and difficulty reaching the grassroots. In addition, the country's
primary organization representing the legal profession, the Nigerian Bar
Association (NBA), is at a crossroads. While it engaged in certain positive
actions during the military era and since 1999, overall the NBA has been
228. See Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission and
Gani Fawehinmi v. General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle Togun,
[2003] M.J.S.C 63 (Nigeria).
229. Id. at 63.
230. Id.
231. Human Rights, supra note 217; Judiciary, supra note 217; Travails, supra note 217; UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, supra note 217; GUAKER, supra note 217; OKAFOR, supra note 112, at
183.
232. Judiciary, supra note 217, at 679.
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beset by a series of challenges. 233 A similar mixed-bag of results has
accompanied the efforts of educators who have sought to improve access to
the legal process. We examine these two civil society movements in turn.
i. The NBA
The NBA predates Nigeria's independence by nearly three decades.234
In fact, in 1933 the British passed the Legal Practitioners Ordinance, which
officially gave the NBA the power to nominate members to a government
committee to investigate lawyer misconduct. 235 During the colonial period,
NBA members, many of whom were trained under the English legal
education model, banded loosely together for professional purposes,
including networking, sharing referrals, developing business connections,
and engaging in political advocacy. 236 And as past research has shown,
such professionals were instrumental in the independence movement.237
At points in the post-colonial era, the NBA has served as the preserver
of the bar's reputation and integrity, the defender of individual rights and
liberties, and an opponent of state oppression. It has done so through
formal and grassroots means. Institutionally, the NBA was an important
player in the passage of the first two post-independence statutes regulating
the legal profession - the 1962 Legal Practitioners Act (LPA), which was
then replaced by a 1975 version under the same name.238 The 1975 LPA
has remained the signature piece of legislation governing lawyers in
Nigeria to this day. It is accompanied by an administrative set of "Rules of
Professional Conduct" 239 passed by the General Council of the Bar, which
233. See, e.g., Nicholas Ibekwe, Inside the Rot Called the Nigerian Bar Association, PREMIUM
TIMES (June 15, 2013), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/138802-exclusive-inside-the-rot-called-
nigerian-bar-association.html (showing that incorporated within the skepticism of the bar are similar
sentiments, by some, towards the judiciary).
234. Id. at 233.
235. OKO, supra note 11, at 29; See also Ronald Otaru, Paper Presentation at NBA Ilorin 2013
Retreat at Armti, Ilorin, Kwara State, Developing a Better Attitude of Lawyers to Client, Registry and
Court, 4-5 (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.otaruotaru.com/papers/ARMTI%20ILORIN%20LECTURES%20FRM%20SAN.pdf..
236. See Nigerian Bar Association, The History of the Nigerian Bar Association, Port Harcourt
Branch, (Dec. 30, 2016), http://nbaph.org.ng/history.php. See also, OKO, supra note 11, at 99-103.
237. See Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for
Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573, 635-636 (2000) ("The Nigerian legal profession
that admirably served as a vital piece of the struggle for independence has undergone a tremendous
transformation.")
238. The 1975 act has had amendments added to it over the years as well, including in 1990, 1994,
and 2004.
239. See Michael C. Ogwezzy, The Legal Practitioners Act: A Code for Regulating the Conduct of
Lawyers in Nigeria, 3 AGoRA INT'L. J. JURIDICIAL SCIENCES, 108, 109 (2013) (noting that "[t]he rules
were made by the General Council of the bar in 1967 and amended in 1979 and published in the Federal
Government Official Gazette dated 18 January, 1980 on the 7th of February, 2007 the existing rules
were reviewed and a new set of rules was made for the profession.").
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is comprised of the federal attorney general, the attorneys general of each
of the states, and importantly, 20 members of the NBA. 240 Under the LPA,
the General Council is "charged with the general management of the affairs
of the"24' association. Even though the NBA does not have a majority of
seats on the General Council, given its numbers it is able to shape how
lawyers in the country must professionally conduct themselves.
Relatedly, the NBA is able to play a key role in determining who is
admitted to practice as a lawyer.242 The Association's President, along with
30 other members, serves on a standing committee known as "the Body of
Benchers," 243 who are "responsible for the formal call to the Bar of persons
seeking to become legal practitioners."244 And the NBA is represented on
the Council of Legal Education (the body that certifies those who pass the
bar exam) in overseeing the Nigerian Law School - the institution from
which university law graduates must matriculate and graduate before they
can practice.24 5
Through these different roles, the NBA has had crucial input in
promoting a range of values it wishes its members to follow - including
giving affordable and pro bono legal aid to those in need. Codified in the
NBA Constitution is the goal of creating a framework of legal aid for those
socially and economically disadvantaged.2 46  In addition, the NBA's Law
Reform and Human Rights Committees are mandated to offer free legal
representation to the poor.247
Recently in June of 2017, the NBA entered into a formal partnership
with the Legal Aid Council to provide pro bono assistance to inmates who
240. See Legal Practitioners Act (1975) Cap. 207 §1(2) (Nigeria). See also OKO, supra note 11, at
37 (noting that "beyond formulating the rules of professional practice, the General Council of the Bar
does not perform any other useful function.")
241. See Legal Practitioners Act § 1(2); OKO, supra note 11, at 37.
242. Legal Practitioners Act §3.
243. Id.
244. Id. (noting also that this body's members include: "(a) the Chief Justice of Nigeria and all the
Justices of the Supreme Court; (b) the President of the Court of Appeal; (c) the Attorney-General of the
Federation and Minister of Justice; (d) the Presiding Justices of Court of Appeal Divisions; (e) the Chief
Judge of the Federal High Court; (f) the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; (g) the
Chief Judges of the States of the Federation; (h) the Attorneys-General of the States of the Federation;
(i) the Chairman of the Council of Legal Education; ... and such number of persons, not exceeding ten,
who appear to the Body of Benchers to be eminent members of the legal profession in Nigeria of not
less than 15 years post-call standing."); See also OKO, supra note 11, at 35-36.
245. See NIGERIAN LAW SCHOOL, available at http://www.nigerianlawschool.edu.ng/ (last visited
Feb. 10, 2018).
246. See NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION 21 (2015)
http://www.nigerianbar.org.ng/index.php/downloads/send/2-documents/1 -nigerian-bar-association-
constitution.
247. Id. at 21, 44 (2015) (noting in the constitution that each respective committee "[s]hall provide
free legal aid services in suitable circumstances.")
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have been languishing in Nigeria's overcrowded prisoners. 248  A month
after this compact was signed, the partnership expanded to include an
international component, as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
joined to lend legal services to indigent defendants facing prosecution for
narcotics offenses.2 49
In the rights-based litigation that occurred during the military years and
then in the post-1999 era, lawyers who were part of those struggles were
also members of the NBA. Indeed, in the more famous cases (including the
Saro-Wiwa litigation), the NBA had a central role in championing these
rights-based claims.
But the NBA also used other tactics. Consider a famous 1984 episode
when Buhari was in charge. His regime instituted several draconian
decrees, including establishing military tribunals where formal rules of
evidence and procedure were not in effect.250 Another decree went so far
as to suspend the rights established by the 1979 Constitution. 25 1 The latter
measure abridged individual liberties and civil rights and curtailed the
independence of the judiciary.252
The NBA decried these orders and staged boycotts and
demonstrations.25 3 Its moves galvanized the public, and soon thereafter
there were other mass protests. 25 4 Buhari's regime cracked down on these
activists, but the protestors, including the NBA, were undeterred. 255  By
August of the following year, Buhari was out.256 Although there were
additional reasons for why he was toppled, the NBA, which had been until
that point seen as a stolidly conservative cohort, gained enormous political
capital through its defiant confrontation. Even the subsequent Abacha
government could not ignore the NBA. In his early years, Abacha
248. Bukar Waziri, NBA Gives a Major Boost to Pro Bono Legal Services in Nigeria, NIGERIA BAR
ASSOCIATION (July 18, 2017), http://www.nigerianbar.org.ng/index.php/newsl/306-nba-gives-a-major-
boost-to-pro-bono-legal-services-in-nigeria.
249. See Adelanwa Bamboye, Legal Aid, NBA, UNODC on Free Services, DAILY TRUST (July 25,
2017), https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/law/legal-aid-nba-unodc-on-free-services/206890.html.
250. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 212-216; See also OKO, supra note 11, at 230-239,
243-250.
251. FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 212-16; See also, OKO, supra note 11, at 230-39, 243-
50.
252. FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 212-16; See also, OKO, supra note 11, at 230-39, 243-
50.
253. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 215 (noting that the NBA was "unsuccessful" in
keeping law enforcement out of the military tribunals). See also, USMAN A. TAR, THE POLITICS OF
NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRACY: STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN NIGERIA 75 (2008); See also, OKO, supra
note 11, at 230-39, 243-50.
254. See TAR, supra note 253, at 75.
255. Id.
256. Id. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 24, at 212-16.
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appointed various NBA lawyers to serve in his government.257 Abacha
eventually came to revile the NBA, but the fact that the government had to
acknowledge the organization demonstrated the capital it possessed.258
Today, the NBA remains an important force within civil society, but it
has encountered recent challenges. In 2016, a prominent human rights
lawyer, Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, called upon the NBA to engage in strikes
and boycotts after the Department of State Services conducted raids on the
homes of several judges presiding over cases involving government
officials.259 Harkening back to 1984, he declared that the Nigerian
government was returning to a "jackboot system of intolerance." 26 0  That
the NBA vacillated on Adegboruwa's suggestion drew noticeable criticism.
The Association felt added pressure that same year, on a separate matter,
from human rights activist Femi Falana who wanted it to do more when
actual, known corruption was discovered in the judiciary. 261 The NBA's
reputation was further damaged in a report released by the government's
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, which found that some
senior lawyers had been complicit in cases of money laundering.262 And in
257. See ENOGIASUN OTOGHAGUA, PROFILE OF NIGERIA HEADS OF STATE, 1960-2003 120 (1999).
For strong criticism of NBA lawyers who took positions with the government see OKO, supra note 11,
at 227-29 (noting that: "Former Presidents of the Bar Association [and other lawyers] who accept
appointed positions in a military government betray their ethical obligations and tarnish the image of
the profession.").
258. See OKO, supra note 11, at 227-29 (arguing that there was "political manipulation" on the part
of the government vis-A-vis the NBA). See also, Gbenro Adeoye, Nigerian Bar Association Lawyers
Know All Corrupt Judges, Lawyers in Nigeria - Falana, SAHARA REPORTERS, (Oct. 22, 2016),
http://saharareporters.com/2016/10/22/nigerian-bar-association-leaders-know-all-corrupt-judges-
lawyers-nigeria-%E2%80%93falana (writing about lauded human rights lawyer, Femi Falana, who
recently noted that during the military period when "judges were harassed or lawyers were detained, the
NBA leaders would ... [routinely] find out the basis of any arrest. . . . In 1987, Aka-Bashorun [the
former NBA president] mobilized 270 lawyers to defend the late [human rights advocate] Gani
Fawehinmi. He was fighting a very corrupt military junta. When the same military dictators later
charged some of us with treasonable felony, the NBA also defended us. The NBA also rallied round
nonlawyers like Comrade Balarabe Musa [a leftist opposition leader] and Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti [a
medical doctor and human rights activist] as they were in the forefront of the struggle for the restoration
of democratic rule.")
259. See Dyepkazaha Shibayan, Adegboruwa: Buhari Has Taken Us Back to the 1984 Jackboot Era
of Intolerance, THE CABLE, (Oct 8, 2016), https://www.thecable.ng/adegboruwa-buhari-has-taken-us-
back-to-the-1984-jackboot-era-of-intolerance.
260. Id
261. See Femi Falana Blasts Nigerian Bar Association, EASTWIND NEWSPAPER, (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://eastwindnewz.wordpress.com/2016/10/10/femi-falana-blasts-nigeria-bar-association/; Omatayo
Yusuf, Fema Falana Blasts NBA for Shielding Corruption, NAJICOM (Oct 10, 2016),
https://www.naij.com/1001312-femi-falana-supports-arrest-corrupt-judges-blasts-nba-promoting-
corruption.html.
262. EFCC Tackles NBA President; Says Nigerian Bar Populated by 'Rogues and Vultures',
PREMIUM TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016) http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/209409-efcc-
tackles-nba-president-says-nigerian-bar-populated-rogues-vultures.html. For an excellent analysis of
the role senior lawyers in the NBA have played in combatting the government's attempts to stamp-out
corruption, see Aminu Gamawa, The Fight Against Anti-Corruption Agencies by NBA, FACEBOOK
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/aminugamawa/posts/1 112314568852875:0.
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2017, the current president of the NBA, A.B. Mahmoud, had his election
win voided by a federal court, which ruled that the NBA constitution, upon
which his victory was premised, had been amended in an improper
fashion.263
Perhaps the harshest criticism, however, came from a confidential
report on the "secretariat" of the NBA, which was leaked to the press in
2013. The secretariat is the bureaucratic arm of the NBA that originally
handled only "minor administrative and logistical issues... [to today where
it oversees] programming responsibilities, requiring the full attention of a
professional cadre...." 264 In 2012, the president of the NBA constituted an
external committee to review the secretariat, which had developed the
reputation for lethargy, corruption, and incompetence. 265 Chaired by Chidi
Odinkalu, 26 6 the committee's final report not only confirmed these negative
images, but it offered other damning conclusions.267
The committee found great haphazardness in how the secretariat's
leadership and staff functioned. 2 68  There was also an overall lack of
funding, and as such, no financial incentive for employees to perform
efficiently. 2 69  Weak resources prevented the secretariat from: organizing
quality legal aid programs, instituting measures to improve the staff's
ability to assist those in need, and distributing information on the NBA's
outreach initiatives.270 Yet most disturbing was the committee's finding
that there existed a hostile workplace environment within the
administrative headquarters. 2 71 As the report noted, "there is a clear pattern
of credibly attested allegations of work-place bullying, abuse and sexual
harassment, intimidation and exploitation, with no mechanisms of
workplace recourse . . . ."272
The story of the NBA, therefore, is a complicated one. As one of the
longest standing civil society organizations in the country, the NBA has
been at the forefront of key rights-based moments. At the same time, there
have been problems -indeed major ones. The NBA thus epitomizes a
263. Court Voids 2015 NBA Constitution, Sacks Mahmoud as President, THE CABLE (Mar. 31,
2017), https://www.thecable.ng/court-voids-2015-nba-constitution-sacks-mahmoud-president.
264. Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) Committee on Professionalization of the NBA Secretariat,
Final Report 4 (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter NBA Final Report], available at
https://www.preniumtimesng.com/wp-content/files/2013/06/NBA-Secretariat-Prof-Cmmttee-.pdf
265. Id.
266. Id. at 10.
267. See generally id.
268. Id. at 5.
269. Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) Committee on Professionalization of the NBA Secretariat,
supra note 264, at 5-7.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 6.
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group that is conflicted; perhaps not surprising given the environment in
which it operates.
ii. The Clinical Legal Education Movement
Oko has written extensively on the ills plaguing the Nigerian bar and
judiciary.273 From pervasive corruption, to excessive delay, incompetence,
and a lack of transparency, Oko has pleaded for the state in the post 1999-
era to take legal reform seriously. 27 4  He argues that a healthy legal
profession is necessary for "democratic consolidation" 275  in Nigeria.
Indeed, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of this process and to
commit to a range of principles to improve the public good.276
One group adhering to Oko's advice has been clinical legal educators.
In 2003, the "[f]irst All-Africa Colloquium on Legal Education . . ." was
held in Durban, South Africa.277 Sponsored by three different
organizations, 278 the conference brought in educators skilled in clinical
practice from around the continent. 2 79  Although formal clinical education
had not been incorporated into Nigerian law schools, representatives from
the country's newly created Network of University Legal Aid Institutions
(NULAI) attended.280 Perhaps, the most studied portion of this conference
was on how South Africa's legal aid clinics interacted with civil society
and government agencies to deliver services to the poor.281 NULAI
officials were particularly interested in this aspect, and the following year,
it sponsored a conference in the capital, Abuja.282 Since then, NULAI has
been actively engaging in national and continental seminars, and it has
273. See generally OKO, supra note 11; Oko, supra note 237.
274. See generally OKO, supra note 11; Oko, supra note 237.
275. Oko, supra note 237, at 264. See also Okechukwu Oko, Lawyer's in Fragile Democracies and
the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Experience, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295,
1318 (2009) [hereinafter The Nigerian Experience]; Okechukwu Oko, The Problems and Challenges of
Lawyering in Developing Societies, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 569, 642 (2004).
276. See The Nigerian Experience, supra note 275, at 1318 (arguing that lawyers should be stronger
at "promoting accountability, strengthening public institutions, recapturing the sense of public good,
rejuvenating the civil society, and helping to improve security.")
277. COMBINING LEARNING AND LEGAL AID: CLINICS IN AFRICA REPORT ON THE FIRST ALL-
AFRICA COLLOQUIUM ON CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, 23-28 June 2003 1-2 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter
COMBINING LEARNING],
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/southafrica_20030628.pdf.
278. Id. at 3.
279. Id. at 2. See also The Network of Clinical Legal Education, NULAI, [hereinafter The Network]
http://www.nulai.org/index.php/blog/83-cle (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
280. Combining Learning, supra note 277; See also The Network, supra note 279.
281. See COMBINING LEARNING, supra note 277, at 6-8; see also Combining Learning and Legal
Aid: Clinical Legal Education in Africa, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (June 28, 2003),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/combining-learning-and-legal-aid-clinical-legal-
education-africa.
282. The Network, supra note 279.
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sought to press law faculties throughout the country-49 in total-to
incorporate skills education into their curriculums.28 3
NULAI's efforts have not been in vain. In less than a ten year period
(2005-2014), NULAI helped found 17 clinics across the country.28 4 It also
established a clinical program at the Nigerian Law School.285 In addition,
in 2011, the group successfully lobbied the federal government to amend
the Legal Aid Act to include a new provision, which provided NULAI-
established law clinics with the opportunity to receive the government's
imprimatur.286 This was an important step because potential clients looking
for credentialed, bona fide assistance could now feel more assured that
these legal aid providers were government certified.287
As for how these legal aid clinics are performing, the empirical
evidence is modest but hopeful. In 2006, the Nigerian Law School
incorporated mandatory clinical classes into its curriculum. 288 Over a three
year period (2006-2009), one study found a correlation between students
who were enrolled in this new curriculum and higher bar passage rates-
higher in comparison to the pass-rates of those who were enrolled prior to
the adoption of the clinical courses.2 89 Other studies have described the
operation of clinics within university law faculties. For example, clinical
law students at Ambrose Alli University receive training on how to assist
fellow students who cannot afford legal representation with different civil
claims they encounter. 290  The University of Ibadan Women's Law Clinic
offers students the chance to work with rural women on issues relating to
health rights.29 1 The students here also use "the mobile clinic approach"-
283. Id. Note, as of 2016, there are 15 federally-based law faculties, 19 state-based law faculties,
and 15 private law faculties in Nigeria. See Updated: List ofAccredited/Approved Faculties ofLaw in
Nigeria, THE NIGERIAN LAWYER (Sept. 21, 2016), http://thenigerialawyer.com/updated-list-of-
accreditedapproved-faculties-of-law-in-nigeria/.
284. The Network, supra note 279; See also Oluyemisi Bamgbose, Access to Justice through
Clinical Legal Education: A Way Forward for Good Governance and Development, 14 AFR. HUM. RTS.
J. 378 (2015) available at http://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/images/ahrlj/2015/Chapter%207_2_2015.pdf).
285. See The Network, supra note 279; Bamgbose, supra note 284, at 395.
286. See The Network, supra note 279.
287. See The Network, supra note 279; See Bamgbose, supra note 284, at 379-381.
288. Upon graduation from this post-LL.B. training institute, students take the Nigerian Bar Exam.
See Odigie-Emmanuel Omoyemen Lucia, The Impact of Clinical Legal Education Curriculum and
Delivery on Students Performance: A Case Study of the Nigerian Law School, in 9TH INT'L J. FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDU. CONF. 7-8 (Jul. 11-15, 2011), available at https://www.gaje.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/RESEARCH-FINDINGS.pdf
289. Id. at 37 (although noting that the number of those students who passed with the highest grades
was "still very low to reach concrete conclusions.")
290. See S.K Mokidi & C.A. Agbebaku, Legal Clinics and Professional Skills Development in
Nigeria, 17 INT'L J. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 38, 44-45 (2012), available at
http://www.northumbriajournals.co.uk/index.php/ijcle/article/view/44/48.
291. See Kevwe Omoragbon, Interface of Law and Medicine: Success Story of Clinical Legal
Education in Improving Health of Women and Ensuring Women's Access to Justice, 17 INT'L. J. OF
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 49, 54 (2009), available at
[Vol. 42:2236
Legal Activism
vehicles take them and their supervisors to villages to educate women on
their rights.292 Furthermore, certain clinics today are partnering with NGOs
in order to cover a wider range of cases. 293  There are also other studies
lauding clinics elsewhere as being a "panacea" 294 for law students and
lawyers interested in assisting on social justice causes.295
The scholarship mentioned above indicates that clinical legal education
has had a positive impact on ordinary Nigerians' to better access justice.
However, there are caveats. Dean Sam Erugo, an academic and
practitioner from Abia State University in southeastern Nigeria, has been
an enthusiast, albeit a cautious one. 2 96  Erugo notes that while clinics are
providing needy clients with services they otherwise may not receive, the
legal assistance is still being given by students.2 97 Of course, there is
supervision by faculty, but it is not a substitute for having seasoned
practitioners serving as legal representatives.298 Moreover, university law
faculties continue to struggle for resources. 2 99 As a result, there are many
challenges that hinder these institutions, including hiring and retaining
committed, full-time clinicians,300 as most law faculty members are part-
time employees.3 01 Training students in a clinical manner can be expensive
as well.
http://www.northumbriajournals.co.uk/index.php/ijcle/article/view/45/49;); Ibijoke Patricia Byron, The
Relationship Between Social Justice and Clinical Legal Education: A Case Study of the Women's Law
Clinic, Faculty ofLaw, University ofIbadan, Nigeria, 20 INT'L. J. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 563, 571-73
(2014), available at http://www.northumbriajournals.co.uk/index.php/ijcle/article/view/22/27.).
292. Omoragbon, supra note 291, at 54. Also, for a discussion on Ibadan, see Afolasade A.
Adewumi and Oluyemisi A. Bamgbose, Attitude of Students to Clinical Legal Education: A Case Study
of Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan, 3 ASIAN J. LEGAL EDUC. 106 (2016), available at
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2322005815607142.
293. See Bamgbose, supra note 284, at 394.
294. See generally Emeka James Kalu, Clinical Legal Education: A Panacea for the Training of
Ethically Conscious and Socially Responsible Lawyers - A Case of National Open University of




295. See also, Charles Olufemi Adekoya, Meeting the Required Reforms in Legal Education in
Nigeria: Clinical Legal Education-Ten Years After, 20 INT'L. J. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 603, 603-613
(2014).
296. See Sam Erugo, Legal Assistance by Clinical Law Students: A Nigerian Experience in
Increasing Access to Justice for the Unrepresented, 3 ASIAN J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 160 (2016),
available at http://journals.sagepub.com.libdata.lib.ua.edu/doi/pdf/1 0.1177/2322005816640335.).
297. Id. at 173.
298. Id. at 168.
299. See generally NBA Final Report, supra note 264. Note, the observations made in this
paragraph and the subsequent one are based on the authors' direct experiences with the Nigerian legal
system and with different Nigerian law schools. For the first author, these run from 2011-2017, as he
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300. See generally NBA Final Report, supra note 264.
301. Id. at 24.
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In addition, many university law faculties lack modem infrastructure,
sound technology, and sufficient administrative support.302 There is also
the problem of recruiting top quality students. 3 03  Divisive politics, and
even corruption, infest many university law faculties, which affects how
these institutions operate-from who is admitted, to who is hired, to who is
rewarded, to the types of programs that are prioritized. 304 Thus, for all the
important progress clinical legal education has made in such a short period
of time, these adverse conditions still make it difficult for this pedagogical
model to thrive within the vast majority of Nigerian law schools.
CONCLUSION
This study has sought to provide a comprehensive overview of the state
of legal aid in Nigeria since 1960. The instability of Nigerian politics over
the last six decades has made the delivery of legal assistance to those in
need a monumental challenge. Even further complicating this situation is
the fact that corruption, and perceptions of it, continue to hamper efforts to
consolidate this fragile democracy. Peter Obutte's recent paper notes that
corruption has long infiltrated the Nigerian judiciary.os A recent survey by
the country's National Bureau of Statistics found that that "the judiciary is
the second most corrupt institution in Nigeria."306 Furthermore, the Boko
Haram insurrection in the north, the deprivation of environmental justice
for residents of the Delta region, the constant lack of funding for various
legal aid programs, and the perpetual denial of human rights protection for
disadvantaged minorities, including women, have placed into question how
much substantive progress really has been made.3 07
302. For an excellent overview of the state of legal education in Nigeria, see OKO, supra note 11, at
97-143.
303. See id at 110-116.
304. Also, for important background on the culture and landscape of the situation, see id. at 97-143.
305. See Peter Chukwuma Obutte, Corruption, Administration of Justice and the Judiciary in
Nigeria, SSRN, 1-2 (Feb. 3, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2727319; See
also id. at 367-78.
306. See Evelyn Okakwu, Nigerian Judiciary Not as Corrupt as NBS Shows - NJC, PREMIUM
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2017), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/240878-nigerian-judiciary-
not-corrupt-nbs-report-shows-njc.html (noting that the National Judicial Council rejected these
findings).
307. Each of these topics are potentially separate papers unto themselves. But for a sample of
scholarship on some of these points, See A.O. Bowen, Operational Assessment ofLegal Aid in Nigeria,
in L. & DEVELOPMENT 259 (J.A. Omotola et al. eds., 1987); Victoria E. Kalu, State Monopoly and
Indigenous Participation Rights in Resource Development in Nigeria, 26 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 418 (2008); Itoro Eze-Anaba, Domestic Violence and Legal Reforms in Nigeria:
Prospects and Challenges, 14 CARDOZA J. L. & GENDER 21 (2007); LEGAL RESOURCES CONSORTIUM,
TRANSFORMING THE PROVISION OF LEGAL AID SERVICES IN NIGERIA 4 (Discussion Paper 2004); Ibibia
Lucky Worika, Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither Environment and Human Rights in
Nigeria's Niger Delta?,? 8 ISLA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2001).
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Still, as this study has shown, even in the bleakest of times, brave
lawyers and organizations have asserted themselves, standing up to military
dictators and defending the rights of the powerless. There are also other
recent examples that provide hope. In 2000, Lagos State opened its Office
of the Public Defender (OPD),30 s with the mission of focusing on the
"rights of the disadvantaged..."3 09 and providing "free representation in
court and legal advice"3"o for the indigent. In 2015, the NBA agreed to
devote greater resources and personnel towards assisting the OPD so that
more people might be served."
Additionally, upon the country's return to democracy in 1999, Lagos
State created the Citizen Mediation Centre (CMC), which was intended to
help parties-regardless of background or financial status-resolve
disputes in a timely and just manner. 312 The CMC proudly reports that its
most recent figures show that "[w]ithin the period of January to December
2015, a total number of 34,511 new cases were received; 20,966
[m]ediated; [and] 19,464 matters were resolved...." The CMC also
notes that in 2015 it helped parties recover over $52 million (USD).314
Internationally, perhaps the most well-known attempt at providing
enhanced access is the Lagos Multi-Door Courthouse (LMDC) project,
which was established in 2002, once again, in Lagos State. Drawing upon
Frank Sander's work, Oyeniyi Ajiboye has written about this initiative and
how the objective behind the LMDC was to allow a court to determine
whether a case should proceed to litigation, or instead, be diverted into an
alternative dispute forum.3 15  As the first "court-connected" dispute
resolution institution on the continent, the LMDC brought together the
Lagos judiciary, the American Embassy, and the Negotiation and Conflict
Management Group, into a private NGO that works on streamlining the
way civil cases enter into local courts.316 Over the years, Ajiboye notes that
308. See Office of the Public Defender, LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT, http://opd.lagosstate.gov.ng/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Akinwunmi Ambode, Lagos Moves to Boost Office of Public Defender,
AKINWUNMIAMBODE.COM (Nov. 29, 2015), http://akinwunmiambode.com/lagos-moves-to-boost-
office-of-public-defender/.
312. See Citizen's Mediation Centre Gains Government Support, BRITISH COUNCIL, (Nov. 10,
2014), https://www.britishcouncil.org.ng/about/press/citizenE2%80%99s-mediation-centre-gains-
government-support; See also, Citizen Mediation Centre, LAGOS STATE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
http://lagosministryofjustice.org/offices/citizens-mediation-centre/.
313. Citizen Mediation Centre, supra note 312 (noting "3,622 matters were adjourned while 1,351
matters were unresolved.")
314. Id.
315. See Oyeniyi Ajigboye, The Concept of Multi-Door Courthouse in Nigeria: Rethinking Frank
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this project has had qualified success."' Cases that otherwise might have
gone through the lengthy process of litigation have been resolved using
alternative means.3 18 But, as Ajiboye concludes, the culture of relying on
litigation to resolve disputes remains the primary mindset of litigants,
lawyers, and even many judges, making it difficult for alternative
mechanisms to gain equal footing.3 19
So, for now, this is how our discussion concludes. Yet, much research
remains, especially as further efforts are made to improve the country's
access-to-justice sector. If, for example, alternative dispute forums
continue to expand in number, several questions emerge:
* Do these forums contain legal standards and procedural due
process?
* How do they operate outside of the cosmopolitan city of
Lagos?
* What types of informal norms exist alongside the more formal
ones?
* What role do legal professionals and NGOs play in this
process?3 20
* How has globalization affected alternative dispute
mechanisms?
* How are socio-economically disadvantaged minorities treated
in this process?
* How influential are judges in these forums in brokering
compromises and settlements?
* Perhaps most importantly, are these outcomes just, and are
they perceived as fair by the parties?
Clearly, the answers to these questions are for another day. The hope,
however, is that future researchers will consider exploring these issues in
317. Id. at 17-18.
318. Id.
319. See id. See also, Biola Adimula, The Multi-Door Courthouse Expands Arbitration in Nigeria,
14 IBA ARB. NEWS 48, 48-50 (2009); Alero Akerdolu, Institutionalising Alternative Dispute Resolution
in the Public Dispute Resolution Spectra in Nigeria Through Law: The Lagos Multi Door Court House
Approach, 12 US-CHINA L. REv. 104, 115-116 (2015).
320. One organization that would be important to examine for future inquiry is FIDA-or the
Federacion Internacional de Abogadas, which translates into International Federation of Women
Lawyers. This group began in 1964 in Nigeria and is part of an international network of partners that
promotes the rights of women and children. How FIDA-Nigeria has sustained itself and the impact it
has had is a ripe subject for rigorous academic inquiry. For a discussion of FIDA, see Olufunmi
Oluyede, Non-Governmental Organizations and Non-Profit Organizations, 47 YEAR IN REVIEW (ABA)
319, 320-21 (2013) (noting the various types of legal aid and pro bono work FIDA does in Nigeria,
through its 31 offices throughout the country.) But for a discussion of how legal aid today remains a set
of "largely unorganized and uncoordinated activities of individual lawyers clearly lacking institutional
support," see OKO, supra note 11, at 408-410.
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order to gain an even deeper understanding of how the legal process can
best serve the needs of those living in Africa's most populous country.

